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INTRODUCTION
When faced with a constitutional challenge to a statute, the
Supreme Court will often determine whether it can rest its rul-
ing on a non-constitutional ground before addressing the consti-
tutional issues. In making this decision, the Supreme Court is
often reluctant to void a statute on constitutional grounds, rea-
soning that it takes greater effort for the majoritarian branches
or states to alter the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Con-
stitution.' Additionally, the Court hesitates to void a statute be-
cause of separation of powers and federalism concerns, as the
Court has read the Constitution as calling for a limited role for
the federal courts.2
Therefore, the Supreme Court and lower courts often apply
the "avoidance canon," which authorizes a court to construe
statutes to eliminate "serious constitutional doubts" perceived by
that court.' But even when avoiding a direct determination
' See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, .485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (holding that if otherwise acceptable construction of
statute would raise serious constitutional problems, Court will construe statute to avoid
such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to intent of Congress). Professor
Thayer proposed that federal courts should invalidate statutes as contrary to the Constitu-
tion only when Congress has "not merely made a mistake, but ha[s] made a very clear one
- so clear that it is not open to rational question."James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of
theAmericanDoctrineofConstitutionalLawr, 7 HARv. L. REv. 129, 144 (1893). See alsoALEXAN-
DER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLI-
TICS 35 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing Thayer's view that courts should pay utmost respect to
other governmental branches' powers and discretion); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a
Judicial Voice 67 N.Y.U. L REV. 1185, 1198 (1992) (discussing concerns about foreclosing
legislative action and commending "measured motions" in constitutional and common law
adjudication); Wallace Mendelson, The Influence of James B. Thayer upon the Work of Holmes,
Brandeis, and Frankfurter, 31 VANo. L. REV. 71, 73 (1978) (explaining Justice Holmes's,
Brandeis's, and Frankfurter's adherence to Thayer's principle of voiding statutes only when
they manifestly violate constitutional provisions); Brian C. Murchison, Interpretation and
Independence: HowJudges Use the Avoidance Canon in Separation of Powers Cases, 30 GA. L. REV.
85, 102 (1995) (discussing Thayer's influence on Justice Brandeis).
' See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-46 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (discussing Court's self-imposed restrictions on use of its power to rule on
validity of congressional act); see also Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case 42 STAN. L. REV. 227,
229 (1990) (discussing limited view of "case or controversy" recently espoused by Supreme
Court); BICKEL, supra note 1, at 116 (espousing limited role of federal courts due to
countermajoritarian difficulty). But see Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91
MICH. L. REv. 577, 667-68 (1993) (questioning extent and force of countermajoritarian
difficulty).
s See Murchison, supra note 1, at 113 (stating that when Court entertains serious con-
1996]
University of California, Davis [Vol. 30:1
about whether a statute is constitutional, a court invoking this
canon nevertheless develops constitutional law and engages in
discourse about constitutional values. Moreover, in using the
avoidance canon as an adjudicatory device, the Supreme Court
sends crucial signals to other courts, legislatures, and agencies
about appropriate methods of constitutional adjudication and
dialogue.
This Article examines the Supreme Court's use and rejection
of the avoidance canon in a variety of free speech cases from
the 1950s to the 1990s. It explores the two primary formulations
of the canon used by the Court and identifies the costs of avoid-
ing direct constitutional rulings. The Article suggests some limits
on use of the avoidance canon and offers factors for employing
the canon, differentiating between appropriate justifications for
avoidance by the lower courts and by the Supreme Court.
The multitude of cases in which courts utilize the avoidance
canon are too numerous to be comprehensibly analyzed in one
article.4 Therefore, this Article examines the significance of the
Supreme Court's use of the avoidance canon in free speech
cases.5 These cases illustrate several points. First, the free speech
stitutional doubts about statutory interpretation, it asks whether alternative interpretation
would avoid constitutional issues); The Supreme Cour 1994 Term, Leading Cases 109 HARv. L
REV. 111, 284-85 (1995) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (discussing application of avoidance
canon).
' The avoidance canon was referenced in approximately 55 Supreme Court cases
involving First Amendment questions since 1944. Search of WESTLAW, SCT Database (Oct.
1995 & May 1996). The Court has decided more than 100 cases since 1944 involving the
presumption that it should construe a statute to avoid constitutional difficulties. Id.
' This Article concentrates on the Supreme Court because it is the apex of our hierar-
chical and precedential system and because statutory interpretation plays a central role in
how the current Court enforces or slights particular constitutional norms. See Wn.LAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 335 n.3 (1994) (noting that approxi-
mately half of Court's annual opinions involve statutory construction questions). Of course,
the state and lower federal courts contribute substantially to the development of federal
constitutional law. The Supreme Court decides fewer than 200 cases annually. State courts
perform the vast bulk of constitutional interpretation in criminal cases. See Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 n.8 (1983) (stating that "[i]n 1982, more than 12 million crimi-
nal actions ... were filed in the 50 state court systems .... By comparison, approximately
32,700 criminal suits were filed in federal courts during that same year."); see generally
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §10.5.3 (1994) (illustrating Supreme Court's
deference to state courts in interpreting state law). By 1995, federal criminal filings reached
approximately 46,000. Caseload Increases Throughout Judiciay, THE THIRD BRANcH, Mar. 1996,
at 1, 3. But the Supreme Court has a heightened role in promoting uniformity in federal
law and guidance for constitutional norms. Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Measured Constitutional
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context involves politically sensitive, controversial issues in which
the Court seems to manipulate the canon selectively based on its
view of the merits of the case.6 Second, free speech cases impli-
cating constitutionally problematic statutes emphasize the tension
between the Court's role as guardian of individual rights against
majoritarian encroachment and its role as protector of structural
constitutional values through application of the avoidance can-
on.7 Finally, free speech cases demonstrate the extremes possi-
Steps 71 IrM. L.J. 297, 298 (1996). The Court's interpretation of statutes in specific cases
has broad precedential ramifications of a substantive nature.
6 Compare, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct.
2374, 2387 (1996) (concluding that Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competi-
tion Act of 1992, as implemented by FCC in regulating "patently offensive" material, is con-
sistent with First Amendment) and Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (affirming
validity of Public Health Services Act § 1008 which discourages abortion counselling) with
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2047 (1994) (holding that city ordinance banning
any residential signs, with some statutory exceptions, was unconstitutional in disallowing
signs stating "For Peace in the Gulf") and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279 (1964) (striking down Alabama Code tit. 7 §§ 908-917 for violating First and Four-
teenth Amendments by providing for defamation damages to public officials).
This selectivity is not a new phenomenon. For example, Roscoe Pound noted that
courts during the Lochner era frequently ignored the canon when confronted with constitu-
tional challenges to progressive legislation and thereby preserved the status quo. See Roscoe
Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 39, 39 (William W.
Fisher, III et al. eds., 1993) (stating that "[i]t is a settled dogma of the books that all
doubts are to be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute .... But it cannot be
maintained that such is the actual practice, especially with respect to social legislation
claimed to be in conflict with constitutional guaranties of liberty and property."). William
Eskridge and Philip Frickey detailed how the Rehnquist Court used the canon and other
clear statement techniques to preserve the status quo and favor structural constitutional
values over individual rights claims. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Con-
stitutional Law: Clear Statement Rues as Constitutional Laumaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 612-
15 (1992). See also ESKRIDGE, supra note 5, at 275-306 (addressing canon but canvassing
theories throughout work). Justice Frankfurter argued for a broad formulation of the can-
on both to support deference to legislative judgments of constitutionality on matters of
progressive social policy and to respect legislative judgments curtailing individual liberties
during the cold war era. See infra Part IVA-B (discussing Supreme Court decisions uphold-
ing convictions of communists for political speech during the cold war era); MELVIN I.
UROFsKY, FELIX FRANKFURTER: JUDiCIAL REsTRAiNT AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 20-22, 31
(1991) (discussing Justice Frankfurter's deference to legislative determinations that meet
.reasonableness" standard of review); Mendelson, supra note 1, at 81-83 (describing Justice
Frankfurter's firm belief in democratic process and his strict avoidance of constitutional
decisions); Nomi M. Stolzenberg, Un-Covering the Tradition ofJewish "Dissimilation : Frankfurt-
er, Bicke4 and Cover on Judicial Review, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. LJ. 809, 818-34 (1994) (describ-
ing Justice Frankfurter's commitment to judicial restraint). Instead of facing the constitu-
tional challenges squarely, the Court revised statutes through use of the canon.
' See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 6, at 612-15 (discussing Supreme Court's evolving
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ble in the Court's reaction to certain constitutional challenges
and in its choices concerning avoidance.' These cases thus high-
light the effect of the political and social climate on constitu-
tional adjudication and the Court's approaches to the canon.
The Court's method of addressing free speech issues has var-
ied with the political context giving rise to these cases. At times,
the Court has been highly protective of free speech. For exam-
ple, it developed the overbreadth doctrine to protect against
possible chilling of protected speech, noting the importance of
that right, and it mandated heightened appellate review of con-
stitutional facts in speech cases due to the social values at
stake.' But when it employs the avoidance canon, the Court
sidesteps its "lawsaying" responsibility that requires it to directly
address constitutional rights and values."0 Thus, an examination
attitude toward protecting individuals through statutory interpretation).
' See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. CL 464, 472 (1994) (reject-
ing broad reading of congressional child pornography legislation to avoid free speech
problems); cf Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191-200 (1991) (failing to apply avoidance
canon). The Rust Court ignored First Amendment concerns raised by abortion "gag rules,"
as well as separation of powers concerns raised by the executive countermand of congres-
sional intent, when the Court affirmed a broad reading of the Agency's interpretation of
Title X. Rust, 500 U.S. at 191.
' See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973) (recognizing that
legitimate state interests are subject to specific constitutional prohibitions); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972) (stating that legitimate governmental purpose cannot be
pursued by broadly restricting fundamental liberties); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photo-
graphs, 402 U.S. 363, 388 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) (expressing importance of constitu-
tionally protected free speech); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-72
(1964) (proclaiming deep national commitment to unfettered political speech). On height-
ened appellate review standard, see Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466
U.S. 485 (1984).
Although the overbreadth doctrine has not been explicitly discarded, its use as an
exception to normal standing requirements has waned in recent decades. For example, in
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 615 (1973), the Court stated that because over-
breadth review is "strong medicine," the excessive scope must "not only be real, but sub-
stantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." But see Michael
C. Doff, Facial Chaliene to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 294 (1994) (argu-
ing that disposition of facial challenges should be linked to substantive area of constitution-
al law and other inquiries). Perhaps the doctrine is less necessary now that courts and oth-
er constitutional actors can reference a highly developed body of First Amendment princi-
ples for concrete factual situations.
'0 When the Court directly addresses the constitutionality of an act, it must either
uphold the act or assert that "an act of the legislature, repugnant to the Constitution is
void." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803).
The avoidance canon is not as direct as Justice Marshall's method of judicial review.
Nonetheless, in applying it, the Court inevitably interprets the Constitution. In choosing
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of the Court's manipulation of the avoidance canon to allow it
to either sidestep or address the free speech issues fairly raised
by these cases furthers an assessment of the canon's stated pur-
poses and actual use. Such an assessment reveals that the Court
allows political considerations to influence its application of the
canon.
This Article argues that the Court should favor direct discus-
sion of the merits of constitutional issues. The Supreme Court
has a heightened role in addressing constitutional issues in or-
der to guide other courts and promote uniformity in federal
constitutional law. When the Court applies the canon, it often
affects the direction of constitutional law without providing clari-
ty and certainty. Moreover, the claimed benefits of avoidance,
such as promoting deference and respecting separation of gov-
ernmental powers, are not generally realized when the Court
uses the canon. For example, when using the avoidance canon
to justify radically rewriting a statute, the Court is not deferring
to Congress. And the Court's own sense of political and institu-
tional frailty is not a valid reason for avoiding its lawsaying re-
sponsibility.
However, when courts do decide to apply the canon, they
should do so discerningly and consistently. This Article develops
factors to assist all courts in determining when avoidance is
appropriate. Central issues in this evaluation include whether
the outcome is sufficiently protective of individual rights or
other constitutional concerns in the substantive context. Courts
should also consider the canon's effect on long-term dialogue
and development of constitutional law and the political contro-
versy surrounding the constitutional challenge, including interac-
tion between various constitutional actors on the given constitu-
tional issue. Additional factors include a court's treatment of
precedent in applying the canon and the extent of ambiguity
surrounding legislative intent. The court should decide whether
its role is that of divining legislative intent or, alternatively, artic-
whether to apply the avoidance canon, the Court must first construe the Constitution to
identify areas of "serious doubt" or determine problematic applications of the statute. Only
then does it "ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided." Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1931). The Court can thus
send signals about what it considers constitutionally problematic without directly ruling on
a constitutional issue.
1996]
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ulating and promoting public values. Finally, the proper applica-
tion of the canon may vary with the level of the court undertak-
ing review.
Part I discusses the two major formulations of the avoidance
canon, the broad and narrow approaches. It then briefly ex-
plores the justifications for avoiding constitutional questions and
assesses the assumptions underlying the use of the canon. This
Part argues that the weaknesses in these justifications and as-
sumptions call for a reevaluation of the courts' use of the can-
on.
Part II uses the Court's recent decisions in United States v. X-
Citement Video" and Brockett v. Spokane Arcades"2 to demonstrate
the broad approach to the avoidance canon. The X-Citement
Video Court identified "serious constitutional doubts" and inter-
preted child pornography legislation to avoid reaching a First
Amendment issue." The Brockett Court rewrote a state moral
nuisance statute to eliminate questions about its constitutional-
ity.14
In Part III, the broad approach is contrasted with the narrow
approach to the avoidance canon as illustrated by Rust v.
Sullivan.5 Rust involved a statute which arguably raised serious
constitutional doubts. Rather than applying the broad approach,
under which the Court would interpret the statute to avoid such
constitutional doubts, the Court reasoned that the canon should
not be applied unless the statute was clearly unconstitutional. 6
Part III argues that the Rust Court opted for this formulation of
the canon merely because it wanted to address the constitutional
issue.
Part IV focuses on some of the cases which developed the
free speech doctrine, using them to illustrate the interaction of
volatile political issues and application of the avoidance canon.
This Part focuses on two sets of cases. The first involves prosecu-
tions of Communists under the Smith Act. The second involves
prosecutions under the Federal Registration of Lobbying Act. In
1 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994).
i2 472 U.S. 491 (1985).
13 X-Citement Vueo, 115 S. CL at 472.
14 Brckett, 472 U.S. at 504-07.
'5 500 U.S. i73 (1991).
16 Rust, 500 U.S. at 203.
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both sets of cases, the Supreme Court managed to avoid direct
constitutional confrontation through sometimes creative use of
the avoidance canon. 7 These cases demonstrate how heavily
the Court relies on the avoidance canon when faced with highly
politicized issues.
From the analyses of these free speech cases, the Conclusion
draws together a set of factors that courts should consider when
deciding whether to apply the avoidance canon. These factors
provide a framework within which courts may consider the rami-
fications of avoiding constitutional issues. Use of these factors
will result in more consistency and predictability. These factors
are also presented in the hope that their application will pro-
mote dialogue with Congress and other constitutional actors
about constitutional boundaries on restrictions of free speech.
I. THE AVOIDANCE CANON
The "avoidance canon" is one of a large group of techniques
used to avoid "unnecessary" constitutional questions, as explicitly
set out in Justice Brandeis's famous concurrence in Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority.'8 These techniques, constituting the
" See infra Part VA-B (discussing Supreme Court's use of avoidance canon in cases
involving prosecutions of Communists and prosecutions under Federal Registration of
Lobbying Act).
a 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See generally Lisa A.
Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1016-24 (1994) (listing
components of avoidance doctrine and analyzing their justifications). Commentators also
characterize other judicially created doctrines, such as the justiciability doctrines of stand-
ing, ripeness, and mootness, as additional avoidance techniques. Alexander M. Bickel, The
Supreme Court 1960 Term, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L REV. 40, 43 (1961); Ger-
ald Gunther, The Subtle lrwes of the "Passive Virtues" - A Comment on Principle and Expediency
inJudicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1964) (discussing use of ripeness and political
question doctrine to decline exercising proper jurisdiction); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and
the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1433-34 (1988) (discussing use of
standing as means to decline exercising proper jurisdiction).
The Ashwander Court developed, "for its own governance in the cases confessedly
within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part
of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision." Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346
(Brandeis, J., concurring). The rules explicated by Justice Brandeis are:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly,
nonadversary, proceeding ....
2. The Court will not "anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of
the necessity of deciding it...."
3. The Court will not "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is
University of California, Davis [Vol. 30:1
"general avoidance doctrine," are closely related to other doc-
trines of justiciability and jurisdictional limitations. 9  The
Court's application of the avoidance canon is problematic be-
cause, in applying the canon, the Court engages in statutory
construction and indirect constitutional lawmaking, while side-
stepping its responsibility to directly and fully address constitu-
tional questions. Further, all courts should be wary of the canon
because it is built on numerous debatable justifications and
problematic assumptions. Therefore, before applying the canon,
a court should carefully examine the circumstances surrounding
an action to determine if it can justify its use.
A. Formulations of the Avoidance Canon and Its
Use as a Tool of Statutory Construction
The avoidance canon is one of several "substantive canons"
reflecting constitutional values that govern the interplay of statu-
tory interpretation and constitutional lawmaking." The avoid-
ance canon is generally described as having two approaches: one
broad and one narrow.2' Under the broad approach, a court
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied .... "
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon
which the case may be disposed of....
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one
who fails to show that he is injured by its operation ....
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance
of one who has availed himself of its benefits ....
7. "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even
if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised.... this Court will first ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided....
Id. at 346.48 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
9 See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 119-21 (discussing use of standing as avoidance doc-
trine); Kloppenberg, supra note 18, at 1015-24 (discussing guidelines for application of
avoidance doctrine).
' William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1007, 1020 (1989). Eskridge states that "[tihe most important meta-rule based upon
constitutional values dictates that statutes should be interpreted to avoid constitutional
problems." Id. Sunstein characterizes the avoidance canon as a substantive interpretive
norm with constitutional foundations. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After
Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2111 (1990); see generally GUIDO CALABRESi, A COMMON
LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (analyzing courts' role in statutory interpretation).
" Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1020-21; Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 285.
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should apply the canon whenever a statute raises serious consti-
tutional doubts.' The Supreme Court used this formulation of
the canon in United States v. X-Citement Video to add a mens rea
requirement to the challenged legislation.23 The narrow ap-
proach provides that "if one permissible reading will be constitu-
tional and another will not be, the former must be chosen."24
This approach was used by the Court when it rejected the
canon's applicability in Rust v. Sullivan. Finding that the chal-
lenged regulations were not clearly unconstitutional, the Rust
Court addressed and upheld statutory limitations on abortion
counselling.'
The Supreme Court has used a wide range of formulations of
these two major approaches to the avoidance canon, some limit-
ing potential uses of the canon and others giving judges substan-
tial latitude to rewrite statutes. For example, sometimes the
Court limits the canon to correcting a "scrivener's error" - a
grammatical mistake where the legislature's meaning is clear,
but was "ineptly or inadequately expressed."26 In so limiting its
use of the canon, the Court indicated that the canon is not
applicable when Congress has clearly addressed the constitution-
al issue.' At other times, the Court has suggested that when
EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988). Eskridge describes it thus: "The Court interprets a statute to avoid
constitutional problems even though the broader interpretation would not necessarily be
invalid." Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1021.
" United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464, 471-72 (1994); see infra Part
II (discussing X-Citement Video Court's approach to avoidance canon).
'4 Murchison, supra note 1, at 91 (quoting HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 210
(1967)).
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 183 (1991).
Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 285 (quoting X-Citement Video, 115 S. CL at 474 (Scalia,
J., dissenting)).
" See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 n.3 (1987) (explaining that statute
should be construed without constitutional interpretation by searching for congressional
intent through language or legislative history); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 98
(1985) (stating that statute's overriding purposes and logic must be followed when
determining legislative intent for open-ended, undefined statutory terms); Regan v. Time,
Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652-55 (1984) (mandating that courts uphold parts of statutes if
legislature clearly intended those parts to become effective); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467
U.S. 883, 900-02 (1984) (stating that court overstepped its reviewing authority by granting
Board broader discretion to remedy unfair labor practices without analyzing legislative
intent); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173 (1980) (stating that constitutional
analysis is unnecessary where statutory meaning and congressional intent are plain).
University of California, Davis
the plain meaning of legislation is unreasonable, "courts should
look to the legislative history to determine whether that mean-
ing comports with the drafters' intent" and use the canon to
find a more reasonable interpretation." Its application of the
canon when legislative intent is ambiguous creates difficulties.
The Court has neither determined how much ambiguity is re-
quired to apply the canon, nor has it suggested guidelines, fac-
tors or circumstances to include in an ambiguity analysis. There-
fore, if the canon is applied whenever there is ambiguity about
legislative intent, there would be no meaningful limit on the
canon.2
The First Amendment challenges discussed in this Article
incorporate both the narrow and broad approaches to the can-
on and offer a sampling of the range of formulations the Court
has used in employing the canon. With both approaches, the
canon rests on justifications and assumptions which do not with-
stand close scrutiny.
B. Justifications for the General Avoidance Doctrine
Many people believe that unelected, life-tenured federal judg-
es play a crucial role in vindicating individual rights in a
majoritarian democracy.' The reluctance of federal courts to
address constitutional questions surprises those who believe that
" Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 286. Professor Marshall argues that courts should
employ the avoidance canon only when two statutory readings are equally plausible or
when there is actual evidence that Congress attempted to avoid a specific constitutional
difficulty. Lawrence C. Marshall, Divesting the Courts: Breaking the Interpretation, 66 CHI.-KENT
L REV. 481, 491-92 (1990).
" In one of its broadest formulations, the Court radically rewrote a congressional act
in United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1952), because its limitation of the word "lobbying"
to mean direct (and not indirect) activities was "not barred by intellectual honesty." Id. at
47 (citing Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1928)).
10 See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLmCAL PROc.SS 75
(1980) (stating that stricter judicial scrutiny may be appropriate when enactments adversely
affect groups lacking political power); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135 (1980) (suggesting that Court's role in protecting
minorities should extend beyond removing barriers to participation in political process);
Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1206 (suggesting that Court should "step ahead of the political
branches in pursuit of a constitutional precept" when minority rights are not sufficiently
protected by majoritarian branches). For an argument that substantive results are as
important as a fair process, see Richard Davies Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theo -
And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. LJ. 223, 224-25 (1981) (critiquing Choper and Ely approaches).
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federal courts exist primarily to decide claims based on federal
law and that the Supreme Court has a particular mission to
decide important and far-reaching issues of constitutional law."
Certainly, the Court's certiorari policy supports that view. Consis-
tent with its heightened obligation to promote uniformity in
federal law and provide guidance on federal law issues, the
Court states that it chooses either cases where two or more
federal circuit courts are in conflict or cases which present "im-
portant" or "significant" legal questions. 2 But the Court has
praised and justified avoidance techniques so extensively that the
idea of avoidance whenever possible seems an inextricable foun-
dation of the current judicial consciousness.33 In light of the
Court's role in protecting individual rights, busy federal judges
who might view avoidance as an efficient tool for disposing of
cases should consider the costs of using the avoidance canon.
Based on "the unique place and character. . . of the judicial
review of governmental action for constitutionality," the Supreme
Court has set out six justifications for applying the avoidance
doctrine.'M In brief, these justifications are: (1) the delicacy and
" Kloppenberg, supra note 5, at 339-40.
Sup. CT. R. 10. See also ROBERT L STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 165-210
(7th ed. 1993) (discussing cases construing Rule 10). Further, the fact that the Court's
appellate review of state court cases extends only to issues of federal law, and that state
court judgments are final on questions of state law, reinforces this perception. Murdock v.
City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 599, 634-36 (1874).
" See, e.g., Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (asserting that
questions involving constitutionality of legislative acts are of "greatest delicacy"). Although
Chief Justice John Marshall was not particularly concerned with the counternajoritarian
difficulty, he is frequently quoted for the view that the federal judiciary hears no questions
of "greater delicacy" than those challenging the constitutionality of a legislative act, and
thus the courts should address these questions with the greatest deference. Id. Justice
Brandeis most fully articulated the reverence for avoidance in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valey
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter seems to
have "carried the torch" of judicial restraint after Brandeis retired from the Court,
evidenced in cases such as United States v. Congress of Indus. Ogs., 335 U.S. 106, 124-29
(1948) (Frankfurter,J., concurring). See also UROFSKy, supra note 6, at 31 (indicating that
Frankfurter felt that courts should play restricted role in far reaching questions of
constitutionality); Mendelson, supra note 1, at 83 (indicating that Frankfurter may have
gone even farther than Brandeis in adherence to judicial limitations). Scholars of the legal
process school have also praised avoidance. See genera//y BIC EL, supra note I (discussing
authority and power of Supreme Court); HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1111-380
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (discussing role of courts in
interpretation of statutes).
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947), quoted in Kloppenberg,
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(2) finality of judicial reviiw of legislative acts; (3) the limita-
tions on the authority and jurisdiction of the federal courts; (4)
the "paramount importance of constitutional adjudication in our
system"; (5) separation of powers concerns raised by ruling on
the acts of coequal branches; and (6) the need to show respect
for other branches."5 It is important to critically examine those
justifications now that judicial review is so firmly entrenched in
our polity.' Not all of these justifications rest on a firm analyti-
cal foundation. While the last two are more firmly grounded in
separation of powers concerns, the first four justifications for the
general avoidance doctrine are less weighty because they are
based on exaggerated perceptions of both the federal judiciary's
power and weakness.
In part, the gravity and delicacy of judicial review of legislative
and administrative acts arise from the finality of a court's consti-
tutional ruling; that is, once that final decision has been made,
Congress and other constitutional actors can only change that
ruling by the arduous process of constitutional amendment.37
Under this rationale, a court should carefully consider the rami-
fications before it engages in direct judicial review of acts by the
majoritarian branches because it has "the power to apply and
construe the Constitution, in matters of the greatest moment,
against the wishes of a legislative majority, which is, in turn,
powerless to affect the judicial decision."' If this view of judi-
cial review as "a delicate and final function" is accurate, it impli-
cates both the countermajoritarian difficulty and separation of
powers concerns. 9 However, the finality of direct constitutional
adjudication by the federal courts is exaggerated both by the
supra note 18, at 1035.
' Kloppenberg, supra note 18, at 1035-55. These justifications have also been
summarized as: "(1) judicial economy.... (2) the hierarchical analytic requirements of
legal reasoning ... (3) the 'gravity and delicacy' of judicial review, and (4) the text of
Article IM." James A. Gardner, The Ambiguity of Legal Dreams: A Communitaian Defense of
Judicial Restraint, 71 N.C. L. REv. 805, 812 (1993).
' See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, SUP. Cr. REV. 71, 74 (1995) (arguing that
justifications for avoidance canon are weakened by modem trend towards more aggressive
judicial review).
See Kloppenberg, supra note 18, at 1036-42 (analyzing delicacy and finality
justifications in detail).
BICKEL, supra note 1, at 20.
Kloppenberg, supra note 18, at 1037.
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courts and by other constitutional actors.' Therefore, the con-
cerns raised by the finality of a ruling are not well founded.
In addition to being based on fears of a federal judiciary
powerful enough to produce finality and foreclosure, the avoid-
ance doctrine is also based on another, seemingly inconsistent,
picture - that of a weak federal judiciary. Avoidance is ground-
ed on "the inherent limitations of the judicial process, arising
especially from its largely negative character and limited resourc-
es of enforcement."4' This self-proclaimed limited authority and
relative vulnerability of the federal courts raises concerns about
maintaining the credibility of the courts and protecting them
from political attack. 2 Judges fear that overuse of judicial re-
view invites retaliation in the form of congressional limitations
on jurisdiction or refusal to create new judgeships or adequately
fund judicial operations." In short, under this justification, the
judicial branch must step carefully to avoid political land
mines." However, as with the courts' concerns over finality, this
view of the judiciary's weakness is exaggerated. The federal
courts, including the Supreme Court, are remarkably vital and
enduring despite nearly two hundred years of judicial review.
'0 See Friedman, supra note 2, at 665-66 (describing pro-choice movement's resurgence
after Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989)); Kloppenberg, supra note 5,
at 318-25 (discussing ferment of activity among other branches and states after Webster). For
example, when David Frohnmayer, former Oregon Attorney General, attended a
conference of attorneys general and candidates for political office, he noted that many
politicians who had previously hesitated to state a position on abortion felt pressure to take
a position shortly after Webster, and did so. Id. at 319 n.123; see also Friedman, supra note 2,
at 643-48 (asserting that judicial "finality" is faulty assumption); Robert A. Katzmann, Mak-
ing Sense of Congressional Intent: Statutory Interpretation and Welfare Policy, 104 YALE LJ. 2345,
2358 (1995) (book review) (discussing how case studies by Melnick and Eskridge
demonstrate that Congress modifies or reverses numerous judicial decisions).
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947).
" Kloppenberg, supra note 18, at 1042-43.
41 See WILLIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS
CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937, 285-311 (1994) (detailing political controversy
surrounding judicial review, including retaliatory proposals, from 1925 through 1937).
" Kloppenberg, supra note 18, at 1035-61. Avoidance is sometimes explained by the
perception that direct constitutional decisions are more damaging to the Court's political
capital because it appears that it is announcing an inflexible, irrevocable rule of con-
stitutional law. Marshall, supra note 28, at 486; see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, The Canons of Statutor Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REv. 647, 659-
61, 664 (1992) (stating that judges use canons when societal consequences of judgment are
unclear, when they lack expertise in subject, or when the decision may cause subsequent
embarrassment).
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Even accepting the courts' vulnerability, their duty to address
constitutional issues fairly presented should take precedence over
the courts' concern for their own political viability. The duty to
directly address federal constitutional questions is particularly
heightened for the Supreme Court.' Further, the importance
of constitutional adjudication calls for more, not less, direct
discussion of constitutional claims.' Therefore, the Supreme
Court's role in discussing constitutional issues is particularly pro-
nounced.47
These first four justifications are also inextricably linked with
the separation of powers and comity justifications for judicial
avoidance of constitutional questions. The role of the federal
judiciary must be defined in light of the roles of other federal
branches and the states. The separation of powers and comity
justifications for avoidance do raise concerns - the boundaries
of which are difficult to define and apply." Thus, these last two
justifications may explain why the Court frequently uses the
avoidance canon in politically charged cases and may assist us in
evaluating that usage.
Courts offer several reasons why the canon alleviates separa-
tion of powers and comity concerns. First, they claim that the
canon avoids constitutional adjudication.' But when they in-
Kloppenberg, supra note 5, at 341.
4 Kloppenberg, supra note 18, at 1035-61.
4 See BicKEL, supra note 1, at 127 (citing Solicitor General James Beck's opinion that it
was "a citizen's right to have any constitutional issue ultimately decided by the Supreme
Court, 'as the final conscience of the Nation in such matters'").
" See Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf Between Courts and Congress: A
Challenge for Positive Political Theory, 80 GEO. LJ. 653, 654 (1992) (discussing research
suggesting that Congress and federal courts are largely unaware of other's activities relating
to their own work); see also David B. Frohnmayer, The Separation of Powers: An Essay on the
Vitality of a Constitutional Idea, 52 OR. L REv. 211, 231-34 (1973) (arguing that legislative
and executive branches must take more responsibility for constitutional interpretation).
Professor Althouse has thoroughly explored comity concerns. See Ann Althouse, How to
Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1488 (1987)
(discussing various aspects of comity and focusing on federal interest in promoting
effective functioning of States); Ann Althouse, Variations on a Themy of Normative Federalism.-
A Supreme Court Dialogue, 42 DUKE LJ. 979, 980 (1993) (considering two Supreme Court
views on purpose of federalism).
4' See Kloppenberg, supra note 18, at 1004 (stating that Supreme Court has instructed
lower courts to decide federal constitutional issues only as last resort); Leading Cases, supra
note 3, at 284-85 (stating that courts use avoidance canon to avoid unnecessary
constitutional decisions).
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voke the canon, courts do develop constitutional law by engag-
ing in "quasi-constitutional lawmaking"' and developing "phan-
tom constitutional norms."5" The use of constitutional princi-
ples instead of direct constitutional rulings contributes to confu-
sion for Congress, courts, and other constitutional interpreters,
such as state legislatures and administrative agencies, who often
strive to act within boundaries illuminated by the courts. 2
Further, the canon is justified by the fiction that avoidance
promotes deference to the majoritarian branches" and that it
50 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 6, at 612 (characterizing avoidance canon as
method of "quasi-constitutional lawmaking" whereby Supreme Court under Chief Justice
Rehnquist has overprotected structural constitutional values such as federalism and separa-
tion of powers). In contrast, Eskridge and Frickey demonstrate that the malleable canon
has not been used so vigorously by the Rehnquist Court to protect individual rights. Id. See
also Marshall, supra note 28, at 481 (stating that "we now have a Supreme Court that will be
extremely reluctant to use the Constitution to shield traditionally powerless groups and
individuals from majoritarian decisions, much less to provide these groups and individuals
positive entitlements to governmental benefits and protection").
" Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 549 (1990). Professor
Motomura argues that the Supreme Court has developed "phantom constitutional norms"
in immigration law by frequently employing the canon to undermine the plenary power
doctrine through statutory interpretation rather than through more explicit constitutional
lawmaking. Id.
[C]onstitutional norms manifest themselves in two principal ways. First, they
govern expressly constitutional decisions .... Second, in a less intuitive but
equally correct use of the term, "constitutional" norms provide the background
context that informs our interpretation of statutes and other subconstitutional
texts. This second use of constitutional norms explains and reflects the time-
honored canon that courts ought to interpret statutes so as to avoid constitu-
tional doubts.
Immigration law, as it has developed over the past one hundred years
under the domination of the plenary power doctrine, represents an aberra-
tional form of the typical relationship between statutory interpretation and
constitutional law.
I. at 548-49.
' See infra Part IVA-B (discussing Dennis-Yates line of cases); see also Marshall, supra
note 28, at 487 n.25 (stating that questions are raised about "the vitality of an initial
avoidance-driven interpretation of a statute when later developments in constitutional law
remove the constitutional concerns that prompted the earlier decision").
"' See Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 285 (arguing that "primary justifications for
avoidance canon are to prevent absurd results, to promote legislative efficiency and to
facilitate judicial deference to legislative intent"). Professor Sunstein notes that the canon
reflects separation of powers concerns and "responds to Congress's probable preference for
validation over invalidation." Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatoy State, 103
HARV. L. REV. 405, 469 (1989). Eskridge states that the canon is explained in. part by
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promotes dialogue on constitutional issues between the courts
and legislatures.' Under this rationale, the Court uses the can-
on to send signals to Congress about constitutional problems it
perceives in legislation.55 The canon thus may afford Congress
institutional competence. The Court seeks to avoid confrontations with Congress. Eskridge,
supra note 20, at 1023.
Professor Sunstein suggests that through the use of the canon, courts can satisfy the
probable preference of Congress "that its enactments be validated rather than invalidated."
Sunstein, supra note 20, at 2107. However, others have questioned why Congress should
prefer judicial interpretations practically foreclosing its options over constitutional
consideration of its legislation. FIRUNDLY, supra note 24, at 210; Leading Caes, supra note 3,
at 287. Similarly, Professor Mashaw argues that this is not deferring to legislative
preferences; instead, courts should just engage in serious constitutional analyses of statutes.
Jerry L Mashaw, Teoualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 827, 840 (1991). See also Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation - In the
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 815 (1983) (arguing that policy of
avoiding constitutional questions is rife with problems). If "Congress was conscious of
constitutional difficulties, yet opted to enact a statute that seemingly tested the
constitutional limitations," Professor Marshall argues, "Congress would want its enactment
tested for cownstitutionai, not for a determination of whether it raises a diffwiu/t constitutional
question." Marshall, supra note 28, at 489.
' See Marshall, supra note 28, at 485 (citing professors Bickel and Wellington as
stating, "Many supporters of the avoidance canon have, therefore, justified it as a tool for
promoting judicial restraint and for stimulating dialogue between the courts and Congress
on constitutional issues."); see also Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1017 (stating that
.opportunities for public dialogue - between the Court as it sets forth values of
interpretation and Congress as it drafts statutes - are potentially greater in statutory
interpretation cases").
Professor Murchison praises the canon for advancing a rather "muffled" and
"tentative" dialogue. Murchison, supra note 1, at 169. Murchison's article concludes:
[I]t might be said that the interrogative individualism of the judges was too
modest, the talk too truncated, the questions too indirect. Seeking non-authori-
tative dialogue, did the judges speak too softly? Should the avoidance canon
facilitate more than murmurings about law and change? Or is change often the
product of just this blend of indirection, impatience, pause, and reply? Our
own impatience for new visions should not minimize the inelegant usefulness
of Ashwander or the importance of even muffled conversation.
Id. In examining separation of powers cases, Murchison finds that the canon "illuminat[es]
the struggle of judges with the complexities of precedent and the dynamics of executive
and congressional politics." Id. at 93; see also id. at 114 (stating, "Use of the canon impli-
cated coming to terms, or being unable to come to terms, with precedent in a difficult and
politically charged area of law."). Judges use the canon to raise tensions about their role,
define themselves and assert individualism and independence. Id. at 93.
Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1020-21. Eskridge explains: "The Court should assume
that Congress is sensitive to constitutional concerns and presumably would not pass an
unconstitutional statute; by narrowly construing statutes venturing close to the
constitutional periphery, the Court can signal its concerns to Congress." ESKRIDGE, suprd
note 5, at 276 (emphasis added).
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a chance to clarify its intent. In doing so, Congress could con-
form to the Court's precedents or it could demonstrate that it
wants to challenge the Court's precedents, perhaps hoping that
the Court will alter its earlier position.' However, the dialogic
justification for the canon "would be considerably stronger if
there was some evidence that Congress is likely to accept the
Court's invitation to engage in constitutional dialogue."" In
practice, Congress rarely alters a statute to push the constitution-
al boundaries in response to the Court's use of the canon. Con-
gress is beset with problems of inertia and a heavy workload.'
There may also be reluctance to confront the Court." Further,
Congress may lack political will on specific constitutional issues.
Instead of spurring dialogue, the Court's construction of the
Constitution through the avoidance canon frequently passes into
a "penumbra" of constitutional law without legislative re-
sponse.'
The Court's use of the avoidance canon may actually discour-
age meaningful dialogue on constitutional issues. Legislative
reluctance to respond to the canon may foster the common
perception that the Supreme Court has the "last word" in the
constitutional dialogue.61 Over the long haul, this perception
encourages a lack of legislative responsibility for developing
6 See Katzmann, supra note 40, at 2358 (discussing how case studies by Melnick and
Eskridge demonstrate that Congress modifies or reverses numerous judicial decisions).
Additionally, the Court has changed its constitutional interpretations over time and there
may be other methods of challenging the finality of the Court's readings of the
Constitution. See greeraily Friedman, supra note 2, at 643-48 (asserting that judicial "finality"
is faulty assumption).
"7 Marshall, supra note 28, at 485. Marshall notes that "The hoped for colloquy
between the courts and Congress virtually always ends up as a judicial soliloquy." I&.
SIdA; see gneraUy, Posner, supra note 53, at 821 (discussing revival of strict
construction).
Marshall, supra note 28, at 485.
60 Posner, supra note 53, at 816. Judge Posner terms the "phantom norms" created by
the avoidance doctrine a "constitutional penumbra." Id He warns that use of the canon
yields this dangerous constitutional penumbra due to Congress's general inability or
unwillingness to reject a judicial misconstruction of its statutes. Id.
6' See Marshall, supra note 28, at 493 (arguing that use of canon often perpetuates
courts' perceived monopoly on constitutional interpretation). Marshall states that the
"prevalent model of judicial review has helped create a perception that the courts do take
full care of the Constitution," even when they do not. Id.; see also Kloppenberg, supra note
5, at 352 (discussing different standards of flexibility in application of canon and
emphasizing importance of competing factors).
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constitutional interpretation."2 Thus, repeated use of the canon
may actually inhibit meaningful interaction over time among
legislatures and courts, or discourage participation of other
constitutional actors in constitutional dialogue.63 Employing the
avoidance canon does not "alleviate the impression that the
courts are the only credible expositor of constitutional values
and that the only constitutional job of the other branches is to
obey."" By failing to reach the core constitutional issues and
remanding a case with a new interpretation of the underlying
statute, the Court only compounds the shifting of responsibilities
and does not increase accountability.
" Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain
Meaning, SUP. CT. REv. 231, 250 (1990).
But worse than being built on fiction, the assumption that Congress must have
wanted to avoid constitutional questions denigrates the notion of serious consti-
tutional discourse by Congress; it creates a sense that Congress can never really
be expected to actually talk about and debate constitutionality in a serious
manner, and that it can, therefore, be safely assumed that Congress always
wants the Court to do what the Court believes is constitutionally purest.
Marshall, supra note 28, at 488.
Marshall further notes that "Congress ought to be taking its duty to support the Con-
stitution seriously, instead of treating the Constitution as a collection of inspirational
quotes to be used with rhetorical flourish or as a shorthand reference to what the Supreme
Court is likely to hold on a given issue." Id, at 482.
' See generally, Marshall, supra note 28, at 493 (stating that use of avoidance canon will
not stimulate increased congressional attention to constitutional issues). The limited role of
courts in determining concrete cases and controversies may make the activities of these
other actors all the more imperative. See id. at 482 (discussing courts' constrained readings
of Constitution and citing Robin West, The Meaning of Equality and the Interpretive Turn, 66
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 451, 456-65 (1990)). Professor Thayer saw a similar danger with judicial
review and warned that "the correction of legislative mistakes comes from the outside, and
the people thus lose the political experience, and the moral education and stimulus that
come from fighting the question out in the ordinary way, and correcting their own errors."
JAMEs BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 106 (1974), quoted in Marshall, supra note 28, at
492.
, Marshall, supra note 28, at 495 (stating that courts should "carefully distinguish
between, on the one hand, its description of how courts will adjudicate constitutional challenges
and, on the other hand, the appropriate standard of conduct for government actors"). Professor
Marshall proposes that courts "remand" statutes for express constitutional deliberation
rather than rewriting statutes through the canon. Id. at 502-05. Legislators "would be
forced to grapple with constitutional issues, instead of engaging in the routine constitu-
tional buck-passing that is currently so common." Id. at 502. In addition to increasing
accountability, he argues that such a remand would create a more complete record for
judicial review. Id. at 502-03.
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Moreover, the canon is founded on several problematic as-
sumptions about how legislatures function.65 Determining legis-
lative intent is frequently a difficult and creative enterprise.'
For example, Congress passes legislation with "both specificity
and ambiguity," so that courts and other constitutional actors
can sometimes fill in the gaps.67 The canon recognizes that leg-
islative intent is often susceptible to several reasonable readings
and the canon affords judges the flexibility to read their own
constitutional values into statutes by reference to the text, legis-
lative history, and natural or grammatical readings.' This flexi-
6 See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L REV. 593, 596-97 (1995) (exploring enterprise of statutory
construction and tracing modem scholarly developments that influence readings of statuto-
ry text and heighten skepticism about fixed meanings and legislative intent). Of course,
Karl Llewellyn pointed out the mutually inconsistent nature of the canon 50 years ago.
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 6, at 595. Dean Pound critiqued how courts employed the
avoidance canon nearly 90 years ago. Pound, supra note 6, at 39. See gneraly AMERICAN
LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher, III et al. eds., 1993) (collecting works of legal realists
and illuminating modem statutory construction problems). Drawing on lessons from legal
realism, critical legal studies, feminism, postmodemism, hermeneutics, civic republicanism,
public choice theory and pragmatism, Professor Schacter challenges traditional conceptions
of the role of courts in construing statutes. See Schacter, supra, at 594-96 (discussing
traditional deference to legislature and belief in interpretative neutrality, and advocating
new method of judicial statutory interpretation by channelling decision making through
interpretative principles); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 322-23 (1990) (criticizing statutory
interpretation models that emphasize legislative intent, purpose, and text based on
theoretical foundations which overemphasize universal over particular values).
61 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 5, at 13-47 (examining wide range of theories to illustrate
problems in determining legislative intent). This extremely helpful book draws on prior
work done by Professors Eskridge and Frickey. See also, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note
6, at 616 (discussing revival of intentionalism and inherent problems in finding actual
intent of legislature); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 65, at 598 (discussing different canons
of interpretation).
67 Katzmann, supra note 40, at 2348.
Schacter, supra note 65, at 599-603 (collecting references to numerous
commentators). Schacter's summary is illuminating:
It has become increasingly commonplace to question the capacity of statutory
language to do the work the essentialist model requires. Such "meaning skepti-
cism" targets assumptions at the heart of the traditional account - for exam-
ple, that legislators in fact anticipated and resolved the questions raised in
litigation about the meaning of a statute; that at least a majority of legislators
had the same intent or broad purpose in mind; that language can capture such
a collective design and make that design uncontroversially accessible to a court;
and that a collective legislative design can and does bind subsequent judicial
readers of the statute. If meaning does not inhere in a statute upon enactment,
however, the court cannot passively and neutrally carry out its assigned task of
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bility may be beneficial for updating statutes to incorporate
changing constitutional views over time,' or for updating insti-
tutional assumptions made by courts about other constitutional
actors.7" This updating is similar to the courts' federal common
law role of gap-filling.7 The courts assume that the legislature
presumes that courts will use the canon to correct constitutional
problems.n However, to the extent a court's perception of con-
stitutional doubts is different from the legislature's perception,
this federal common law function is too expansive. It allows
courts using the broad approach to the canon too much leeway
to misconstrue legislative intent.73
The canon also embodies the assumptions that Congress un-
derstands the Court's constitutional precedents and tries to legis-
late within the boundaries of those precedents. But these as-
sumptions are questionable in light of the multiple factors ani-
mating legislation and the complexity of the legislative pro-
mechanically retrieving that meaning.
Id. at 599. See aLso ESKRIDGE, supra note 5, at 42, 119, 133, 224 n.91 (critiquing Justice
Scalia's strict textualism).
' See Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 285-86 (discussing courts' use of avoidance canon
to update statutes "to reflect society's evolving values as they relate to the Constitution").
"Meanwhile, public choice analysis suggests that courts use the avoidance canon to 'update
statutes by construing them to reflect society's evolving values as they relate to the
Constitution.'" Id. (quoting Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1021). Marshall asserts: "If you
belong to the public values school - interpret statutes to make them more palatable to
judges' perception of modern accepted values, the Constitution is a better place than most
in which to find such values." Marshall, supra note 28, at 490.
70 See infra Part III (discussing Court's selection of approach to canon in Rust); see aLso
Murchison, supra note 1, at 166 (discussing Justice White's use of canon to "question[] the
majority's arguably outdated understandings of power and politics" in separation of powers
context). Additionally, such flexibility may produce "democraticizing effects." Schacter,
supra note 65, at 595.
"' Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1063 nn.263-64. Eskridge suggests that statutes are
sometimes deliberately open-textured, and to the extent that the countermajoritarian
difficulty is raised as an objection to public values interpretation, he urges that Congress
sometimes delegates a gap filling duty to the courts. Id. Nearly one hundred years ago,
Dean Pound suggested a similar "solution" to the problem he perceived in the inherent
gap between the law and current public values. Pound, supra note 6, at 41-42.
' Sunstein, supra note 53, at 456 (characterizing canon as "implicit rather than explicit
[legislative] interpretive instructions").
"' See Marshall, supra note 28, at 486 (asserting that "if one believes that the judiciary's
role qua statutory interpreter is to implement Congress's constitutionally valid choices
whenever they can be discerned, then the specter of superconstitutional bending of
statutes is quite problematic").
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cess. 74 Skepticism about whether Congress engages in a ratio-
nal, coherent decision making process compounds concerns
about determining legislative assumptions.75 But even if a legis-
lature attempted to heed the Supreme Court's view of the Con-
stitution, it would often require remarkable foresight (or guess-
work) on the part of the legislature to divine clearly the applica-
ble constitutional principles from the Court's sometimes frac-
tured and murky precedents. 7' This is particularly true given
some of the Court's applications of the canon in which the
Court appears to recognize a new constitutional "danger zone"
or extend the old one beyond prior precedent.77
These considerations indicate that the avoidance canon nei-
ther fosters deference nor advances a long-term constitutional
dialogue. Instead, use of the canon yields changes in constitu-
tional law without the protection of reasoned elaboration' and
without the Court taking responsibility for directly addressing
constitutional questions. Further, the Court's inconsistent and
unpredictable application of the avoidance canon may suppress
" Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executwe Preceden4 101 YALE LJ. 969, 995-98
(1992). Professor Marshall concludes that "[u]nless there is actual evidence that Congress
was concerned with some specific constitutional issue, it is unrealistic to assume that
Congress gave much consideration to the constitutional ramifications of the statute it
enacted." Marshall, supra note 28, at 488 (citing Abner Mikva, How Well Does Congress
Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587,.609-10 (1983)). Judge Mikva relates
that members of Congress often believe that courts, not they, bear the responsibility for
addressing the constitutionality of legislation. See Mikva, supra, at 593-606 (discussing
Congress's role in assessing constitutionality). Katzmann has shown that there is little
awareness of court decisions among the persons responsible for drafting congressional
legislation. Katzmann, supra note 48, at 654-55. Katzmann has also demonstrated that it is
problematic to determine what Congress was assuming in the complex realities of the
legislative process. Katzmann, supra note 40, at 2347. For example, Congress might legislate
in light of anticipated court deference to administrative interpretations, but Congress also
might legislate in light of the avoidance canon and other avoidance practices of courts.
Cynthia Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State 89
COLUM. L. REv. 452, 468-69 (1989); Merrill, supra, at 995-96.
' See generaly, Katzmann, supra note 40, at 2355-60 (reviewing public choice theory
and public interest theory); Schacter, supra note 65, at 603-06 (discussing legitimacy in
statutory interpretation).
' See generally Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1191 (discussing virtues and problems with
Court falling to act as "collegial body").
" See infra Part IVA-B (discussing Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), overuled
on other grounds by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978)).
7' See Schauer, supra note 36, at 88-90 (discussing avoidance canon in context of
Ashwander and X-Citement Video).
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dialogue between the Court and other actors about free
speech." Developing constitutional law through use of the can-
on is a way to avoid meaningful communication.' This is a
poor substitute for dialogue. Magnifying its own frailty and exag-
gerating the majoritarian accountability of the other branches,
the Court attempts to shift responsibility for constitutional inter-
pretation through the dialogic justification for avoidance to
another branch which is also anxious to avoid politically difficult
decisions.
II. BROAD APPLICATIONS OF THE AVOIDANCE CANON
Courts have traditionally applied the broad approach to the
avoidance canon. The Supreme Court decisions in United States
v. X-Citement Video and Brockett v. Spokane Arcades illustrate the
effects of this approach."' In X-Citement Video, the Court applied
the broad approach to the canon when assessing the constitu-
tionality of a federal statute. While there are several possible
justifications for this approach to the canon, the approach can
be criticized for creating separation of powers problems by fore-
closing opportunities for the legislature to take a lead in advanc-
ing constitutional interpretation."2 Similarly, federal courts con-
strain state legislatures when they apply the avoidance canon in
assessing the constitutionality of state legislation. Brockett illus-
' Marshall, supra note 28, at 484. "Judge Friendly observed that questioning this
doctrine 'is rather like challenging the Holy Writ.'" HENRYJ. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARXS 210
(1967)
See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Tern, Foreword. The Forms of Justic4 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 13 (1979) (stating that judges may exercise power only after engaging in
dialogue about meaning of public values); Friedman, supra note 2, at 665-67 (speculating
on public opinion and judicial decision interdependence in abortion case); Katzmann,
supra note 40, at 2345-47 (summarizing current Supreme Court and congressional concern
about ascribing proper meaning to legislation). However, Professor Tushnet criticizes
public values reasoning as utopian because it presumes greater public dialogue and
consensus than we now have. Mark V. Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory,
83 MIcH. L. REV. 1502, 1541 (1985).
SI United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. CL 464, 472 (1994); Brockett v. Spo-
kane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 509 (1985); see also infra Part III (exploring Supreme
Court's rejection of traditional approach in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), in favor
of narrow version of canon); infra Part IV (identifying yet another canon formulation in
which Supreme Court identifies new areas of "serious doubt").
's Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 287-89.
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trates the federalism concerns raised when the Court rewrote a
statute to avoid a constitutional issue."3
A. Separation of Powers Concerns and the Avoidance
Canon - Rewriting Federal Law in
United States v. X-Citement Video
In its recent decision in X-Citement Video, the Court applied
the avoidance canon to uphold "the only federal legislation
designed to prevent the exploitation of children in pornographic
materials."84 The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploi-
tation Act' (the Act) prohibits "interstate transportation, ship-
ping, receipt, distribution or reproduction of visual depictions of
minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct."'a The Court up-
held the Act by interpreting it to contain a scienter requirement
as to the age of a child used in sexually explicit materials."
The dissenters claimed that the Court thus narrowed the reach
of the Act in a manner contrary to congressional intent and
foreclosed future legislative options for regulating the exploita-
tion of minors.s
'a See infra Part II.C (discussing federalism concerns raised by Brockef).
Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 284.
's 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1988).
'n X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 466 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1988)). The Act provided
that
(a) Any person who -
(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce by any
means including by computer or mails, any visual depiction, if -
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engag-
ing in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct;
(2) knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction that has been
mailed, or has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce,
or which contains materials which have been mailed or so shipped or trans-
ported, by any means including by computer, or knowingly reproduces any
visual depiction for distribution in interstate or foreign commerce or through
the mails, if-
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engag-
ing in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; .... shall be punished as provid-
ed in subsection (b) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1988).
87 X-Citement Video, 115 S. CL at 472.
SId. at 476 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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This case arose when Rubin Gottesman, owner of X-Citement
Video, Inc., sold videotapes featuring a child to an undercover
police officer.8 9 Gottesman was indicted for violating the Act.'
At trial, evidence was presented that he sold the tapes with "full
awareness of [the child's] underage performances."91 The dis-
trict court convicted Gottesman.92 In his appeal, Gottesman
challenged the constitutionality of the Act.9"
On appeal, 'the Ninth Circuit ultimately reached Gottesman's
constitutional claims, finding the Act facially unconstitutional
because it lacked an age-scienter requirement.94 The panel rea-
soned that "the term 'knowingly' modifies only the surrounding
verbs: transports, ships, receives, distributes, or reproduced" and
not the separate phrase relating to the age of the child."
Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court found that
the statute did contain the necessary age-scienter requirement
and therefore did not violate Gottesman's First Amendment free
speech rights.' The Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that
under the "most natural grammatical reading" of the statute,'
"the word 'knowingly' would not modify the elements of the
minority of the performers or the sexually explicit nature of the
material, because they are set forth in independent clauses sepa-
rated by interruptive punctuation."' Nevertheless, the majority
cited the avoidance canon, among other reasons, as a justifica-
8 Id. at 466.
92 Id.
9 I d.
Id. at 466-67. The Supreme Court stated that the Ninth Circuit found that it was
necessary "that the defendant possess knowledge of the particular fact that one performer
had not reached the age of majority at the time the visual depiction was produced." Id.
During Defendant Gottesman's initial appeal, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for
reconsideration in light of its holding that the Act did not contain a scienter requirement.
Id. at 466 (citing United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 1990)). In Thomas,
the Ninth Circuit did not reach the constitutional challenges to the Act, apparently because
the court failed to recognize any First Amendment issues. Thomas, 893 F.2d at 1068.
" X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 467.
" Id. at 466.
97 Id. at 467. In contrast, Justice Stevens found it most natural to treat "knowingly" as
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tion for rejecting what admittedly was the most natural reading
of the Act."
The Supreme Court gave three reasons for interpreting the
clause to impose a scienter requirement relating to age.'0°
First, the Court reasoned that the opposite construction would
result in anomalies which Congress must not have intended.' '
Second, the Court relied on the presumption that courts should
imply broad scienter requirements in criminal statutes, even if
the statute does not contain them."2 This presumption is
closely related to the "rule of lenity," under which the Court
adopts the more lenient reading of a criminal statute unless
Congress clearly indicates otherwise. 03 The traffickers' knowl-
edge of the age of the participants in the sexually explicit depic-
tions was thus critical in separating legally permissible from
impermissible conduct."°
Id. at 468.
'® Id. at 467-68.
101 Id. at 467. For example, if "knowingly" modifies only the surrounding verbs like
"transports," the statute would apply to "actors who had no idea that they were even
dealing with sexually explicit material." Id. In the Court's view, Congress could not have
intended the "positively absurd" result of criminalizing the conduct of a retail druggist who
develops film containing sexually explicit depictions of minors without inspecting it, or a
Federal Express courier who delivers a box marked "film" without knowing the content of
such film. Id. at 467-68.
" Id. at 468. For example, in Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), the
Supreme Court relied on the common law mens rea requirement to read a broad scienter
requirement into a federal embezzlement statute which used the term "knowingly" to
modify only the third of three verbs included in the statute. Id. at 271-73. The X-Citement
Video Court pointed out that, consistent with this approach, it had recently applied the
scienter presumption in interpreting the National Firearms Act. X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct.
at 468 (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994)). The X-Citement Video
Court noted that the presumption stemmed from concerns about broadly criminalizing
.apparently innocent conduct" and attaching "harsh penalties" for unwitting violations. Id.
(citing Staples, 511 U.S. at 609). As the X-Citement Video Court explained, based on
precedent, "one would reasonably expect to be free from regulation when trafficking in
sexually explicit, though not obscene, materials involving adults." X-Citement Video, 115 S.
Ct. at 469.
"' See Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, Sup. Cr. REv. 345, 345
(1994) (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1987)) (stating that lenity
provides that "Court should adopt the 'harsher' of 'two rational readings of a criminal
statute only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite language'"). Professor Kahan
argues that the rule of lenity "promotes legislative supremacy by forcing Congress to take
the lead in the field of criminal law and to forgo judicial assistance in defining criminal
obligations." Id. at 351-55.
11 X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 467-68. The Supreme Court has traditionally discussed
University of California, Davis [Vol. 30:1
Third, the Court applied the avoidance canon even though it
had never directly addressed the issue of an age-scienter require-
ment for child pornography traffickers and it had recognized in
other cases that child pornography poses different concerns than
does pornography with adult performers." 5 Despite the lack of
clear constitutional precedent, the Court relied on the avoidance
canon to support its reading of the Act."° Examining the legis-
lative history of the challenged statute, the Court found that it
"speaks somewhat indistinctly" to the particular scienter require-
ment at issue,"7 but noted that Congress was aware of the
Court's relevant First Amendment rulings when the Court con-
sidered child pornography legislation in 1977.1' The Court al-
so looked to precedent, citing four other decisions that suggest-
ed a statute "completely bereft" of a scienter requirement relat-
ing to the age of the performers "would raise serious constitu-
tional doubts.""° Although these cases address the scienter re-
quirement in similar anti-pornography and obscenity statutes,
they discuss scienter only generally, and not in reference to the
age of the performer."0 Based on these factors, the Court con-
cluded that it must read the statute "to eliminate those doubts
so long as such a reading is not plainly contrary to the intent of
the avoidance canon when the breadth or intent requirements of criminal statutes are
challenged. See, e.g., Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 23 (1925) (reversing conviction of
doctor who prescribed opium without filling out federal forms under Harrison Narcotic
Drug Act); Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224, 225-27 (1921) (affirming denial of habeas
corpus relief and avoiding intent question by finding that defendant had pled guilty to
knowing and intentional possession of counterfeiting equipment); United States v. Jin Fuey
Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 402 (1916) (upholding quashed indictment made under Harrison
Narcotic Drug Act due to concerns that criminalizing mere possession might be beyond
congressional authority and due to federalism concerns); see genera/ly Kahan, supra note
103, at 346 (discussing related "rule of lenity").
05 Schauer, supra note 36, at 75-76.
106 X-Citement Vueo, 115 S. Ct. at 467.
07 Id. at 469.
Id. For example, the Court noted that it had invalidated a California statute which
did not include a "mens rea requirement as to the contents of an obscene book." Id.
(citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154 (1959)).
'09 Id. at 472 (citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 122 (1990); New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 123 (1974); Smith, 361
U.S. at 153).
11 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 122; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765; Hamling, 418 U.S. at 123; Smith, 361
U.S. at 153.
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Congress.""' Specifically, the Court said: "In [construing the
statute] we should not assume that Congress chose to disregard
a constitutional danger zone so clearly marked.""' Thus, the
broad approach to the canon allows the Court to presume that
Congress has heeded the Court's precedential warnings and that
Congress concurs with the Court's constitutional interpretation,
even if the text and legislative history of the statute do not
support that presumption.
The X-Citement Video Court's reliance on the avoidance canon
troubled the dissenters."' Justices Scalia and Thomas found
two problems with the Court's use of the doctrine.' They ac-
knowledged that the Court "will often strain" to construe stat-
utes to save them from constitutional attack.' The dissenters
likened this practice to a "scrivener's error" doctrine which "per-
mits a court to give an unusual (though not unheard-of) mean-
ing to a word which, if given its normal meaning, would pro-
duce an absurd and arguably unconstitutional result."" 6 But
the essence of such a practice "is that the meaning genuinely
intended but inadequately expressed must be absolutely clear;
otherwise we might be rewriting the statute rather than correcting
the mistake.""" The Court has frequently noted that only "rea-
sonable" constructions of statutes should be used to save them
from unconstitutionality."' Without such a limitation, "there
"' X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 472.
112 Id at 470 (quoting Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 319 (1957), overruled on other
grounds by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978)). The Court refused to "impute to
Congress an intent to pass legislation that is inconsistent with the Constitution as construed
by this Court." X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 470 (emphasis added). See infra Part IV.A.3
(discussing Yates and avoidance of constitutional questions).
.. X-Citement Video, 115 S. CL at 473 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
'4 Id. at 476 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
15 Id. (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841
(1986)).
..6 Id. at 474 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also implied that it might be more
appropriate to confine such a "scrivener's error" doctrine to the civil context. Ld.
17 Id. (emphasis added).
"' See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (noting that statute should not be construed contrary to
congressional intent in order to render it constitutional); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S.
648, 657 (1895) (stating that reasonable construction is preferred over unconstitutionality).
In Justice Brandeis's famous Ashwander recitation of the general avoidance doctrine,
Brandeis quoted Crower v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932), when he described the avoidance
canon. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
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would be no such thing as an unconstitutional statute" - the
federal courts could simply rewrite legislation to conform to
their interpretation of the Constitution."9 Here, the dissenters
charged that the Court misapplied the avoidance canon by go-
ing beyond a reasonable construction to contravene congressio-
nal intent."
In addition to what the dissenters considered the Court's
alteration of congressional intent in this construction of the
statute, they perceived a larger problem.' In their view, the
Court rewrote the Act "more radically than its constitutional
survival demands."" The dissenters did not believe that the
Act would raise "serious constitutional doubts" if it lacked a
scienter requirement concerning the age of the performers1 ss
The dissenters read the same Supreme Court precedent differ-
ently: "We have made it entirely clear ... that the First Amend-
ment protection accorded to such materials is not as extensive
as that accorded to other speech."2 4 Thus, they believed that
Congress could propose alternative schemes that might pass
constitutional muster, such as a strict liability scheme as to the
age of a performer for certain types of child pornography."z
Alternatively, Congress might choose to enact a recklessness
requirement as the standard of liability.'26
concurring).
The Crowell Court proposed a fairly weak "reasonableness" limitation: "When the
validity of an act of Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
avoided." Crowell, 285 U.S. at 62 (emphasis added). Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Crowell
proposed a narrower version of the avoidance doctrine, arguing that the Court should only
use the avoidance doctrine where a statute is "equally susceptible of two constructions,
under one of which it is clearly valid and under the other of which it may be
unconstitutional .... " I. at 76 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). He concluded that the statute
challenged in Crowell was not equally susceptible to two constructions. Id. However, in
Ashwander, Brandeis memorialized the Crowell majority's formulation of the canon.
Ashwande, 297 U.S. at 348 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
19 X-Citement Vldeo, 115 S. CL at 476 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 474 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
1 Id. at 476 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12 Id.
"I. at 474 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
M I.
" Id. at 475 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
'2' United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 982 F.2d 1285, 1296-97 (9th Cir. 1992)
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The primary criticism of the dissent was that the majority
"raise[d] baseless constitutional doubts that will impede congres-
sional enactment of a law providing greater protection for the
child-victims of the pornography industry."2 7 The dissenters
read the majority as foreclosing future legislative options by
suggesting that a law imposing absolute liability on those traffick-
ing in sexually exploitative materials involving children would
violate the First Amendment.128 In sum, the dissenters accused
the Court of leaving "a relatively toothless child pornography law
that Congress did not enact," and which would be difficult to
strengthen."
B. Ramifications of the Broad Approach to the Canon
The X-Citement Video decision has deeper implications than
merely adding a scienter requirement for child pornography
statutes. Both the majority and the dissent in X-Citement Video
demonstrate that when the Court uses the avoidance canon, it
construes the Constitution. The dissent suggests that invalidation
would be a more measured step which would better promote a
dialogue with Congress about the First Amendment. Although it
may be doing so at a "subconstitutional" or "quasi-constitutional"
level, the effect of the Court's ruling is to give additional weight
to that Court's interpretation of constitutional precedents, and
to signal what the Court considers to be the constitutional roles
of Congress and the federal courts. Because the Court presumes
that Congress listens to its earlier rulings and would not enter
"a constitutional danger zone so clearly marked, " s it affirms
its role of defining constitutional boundaries.
This approach to the avoidance canon may generally impede
constitutional dialogue by not allowing for differing constitution-
al interpretations over time to reflect current public values or
democratic theories.'3' It makes the Supreme Court the locus
(Kozinski, J., dissenting), rWv'd, 115 S. CL 464 (1994); Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 288
nn.70-71.
27 X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 476 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
128 Id. at 475-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id at 476 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 470 (quoting Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 319 (1957), overru/ed on other
grounds by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978)).
"' See generaly Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 6, at 629 (arguing that Supreme Court
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of most change in constitutional law. While this situation may
lend stability in terms of gradual change in the law, it is imprac-
tical and frustrating in light of the Court's limited resources and
capacity; and the practical result is longer retention of the status
quo. 1
32
When the Court applies the avoidance canon, it ostensibly
affords Congress a chance to clarify its intent to push the limits
of the boundaries.33 But Congress may not respond to the
Court's request for a clearer statement."M This legislative reluc-
tance may mean that the Court's use of the avoidance canon to
reaffirm or extend its own precedent effectively terminates con-
stitutional dialogue on an issue, without even a full airing
among the Justices." Moreover, the Court's use of the avoid-
ance canon to set quasi-constitutional boundaries on Congress's
power may foster abrogation of legislative responsibility for en-
suring that legislation meets constitutional requirements. As
Judge Abner Mikva, a former member of Congress, noted: "The
fastest way to empty out the chamber [of Congress] is to get up
and say, 'I'd like to talk about the constitutionality of this bill.'
Members of Congress believe that's what courts are for." ss In
actively reads constitutional values into statutes); Schacter, supra note 65, at 594-96 (arguing
that "metademocratic" method of judicial interpretation advances important democratic
goals). Numerous scholars advocate that an "important role of constitutional interpretation
is to articulate and enforce 'public values' for our nation." Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1007
(citing commentators). See also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTrrUTION 87-
88 (1987) (arguing that constitutional interpretation is process of deciding which
fundamental values should be safeguarded from political majorities).
"52 See Kloppenberg, supra note 5, at 334-35 (discussing role of stare decisis in
preserving status quo in constitutional adjudication).
"' Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 224 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
"4 X-Citement Vueo, 115 S. Ct. at 475 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Judge Posner notes that,
due to Congress's general inability or unwillingness to override a judicial misconstruction
of one of its statutes, the canon yields "a judge-made constitutional 'penumbra'." Posner,
supra note 53, at 816; Marshall, supra note 28, at 485.
i' Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 288. "The Court should refrain from using the
avoidance canon as a crutch to circumvent 'difficult and sensitive questions' because it
essentially denies Congress the opportunity to push the limits of the Constitution as it seeks to
solve social, economic, and legal problems." Id. at 289 (quoting NLRB v. Catholic Bishop,
440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979) (emphasis added)).
5 Linda Greenhouse, What's a Lawmaker to Do About the Constitution, N.Y. TIMEs, June 3,
1988, at B6; see also Marshall, supra note 28, at 481 (discussing "rule of lenity" and
avoidance canon).
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other words, the canon may allow both Congress and the Court
to "sidestep" constitutional questions over time."'
For this reason, an important factor in evaluating the Court's
use of the avoidance canon is whether the constitutional danger
zone is in fact clearly marked by precedent or merely sketched
out by dicta. With regard to the scienter issue presented in X-
Citement Video, the majority viewed the First Amendment bound-
aries as fairly well developed and "clearly marked." s In con-
trast, the dissenters characterized the precedent as leaving room
for a different First Amendment test as to an age-scienter re-
quirement in child pornography.'-9 They charged the Court
with reaching beyond existing precedent to recognize a new
danger zone." ° In situations where the precedent is unclear or
not directly on point, reasoned elaboration, involving a full and
direct airing of the policy concerns and precedent, is preferable
to use of the canon.
Additionally, while a frequent justification for avoidance is the
Court's deference to Congress, 4' the X-Citement Video Court's
use of the canon does not result in greater deference. Following
this decision, Congress was left with a weakened statute and a
quasi-constitutional law warning against constitutional dangers,
rendering enforcement of its legislative aims more difficult.
Instead, Congress might prefer constitutional consideration of its
legislation over judicial interpretations foreclosing its options.4
See Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 286-88 (suggesting that avoidance canon
discourages Congress from being as careful as it could be, which may frustrate dialogue
between Congress and Court); see also Kloppenberg, supra note 5, at 318-30 (discussing
effect of Supreme Court's decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Seros., 492 U.S. 490
(1989), on dialogue with other constitutional actors); Marshall, supra note 28, at 490
(pointing out danger that courts may use avoidance canon "to choose a construction not
necessarily to save the statute, but to save the court from having to decide on the statute's
constitutionality").
X-Citement Video, 115 S. CL at 469 (quoting Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 319
(1957), ovemded on other grounds by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978)).
Id, at 474 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
Id. at 473 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Motomura, supra note 51, at 547-50 (noting
developing limitations of plenary powers doctrine under which courts rarely challenge
other branches).
"' See infra notes 161-65 and accompanying text (discussing federalism concerns as
purpose for applying doctrine).
142 See Marshall, supra note 28, at 489 (stating that Supreme Court should not presume
Congress's preference to comport with its preference); Posner, supra note 53, at 815-16
(noting merits of avoidance canon, but concluding that canon is detrimental because it
19961
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As noted by the X-Citement Video dissenters, the most serious
problem raised by the majority's application of the canon in-
volved separation of powers - the future foreclosure of legisla-
tive options for imposing liability on purveyors of child pornog-
raphy. After the X-Citement Video ruling, Congress could di-
rectly challenge the Court's reading of the First Amendment in
the child pornography context by attempting to pass the statute
again without an age-scienter requirement. However, Congress
will probably conclude that to challenge the Court on the ex-
tent of protection the First Amendment affords purveyors of
child pornography is futile. Thus, it is highly unlikely that a
meaningful constitutional dialogue between the branches will
ever get started; use of the avoidance canon has cut it short.
Congress should not allow the use of the canon in X-Citement
Video to signal the end of debate. Instead, Congress should view
the opinion as an opportunity to make its intent clear, to more
fully air the issue in legislative debate, to clarify the text of the
Act, and try again to impose a higher standard of liability on
child pornography purveyors. The revised Act would likely be
challenged, but another set of Justices might rule differently
than did the X-Citement Video Court."' Even if the Court's com-
position remains constant, the Justices could revise their think-
ing about the First Amendment in light of such a clear, strong
statement of congressional intent.
Some may argue that this scenario is naive considering how
Congress functions and how stare decisis constrains constitution-
al law. But that charge only underscores the costs of avoidance.
Congress and the public would benefit more from a direct and
in-depth discussion of First Amendment protection for child
pornographers, with majority and dissenting Justices attempting
to persuade us to adopt their visions of the First Amendment. X-
Citement Video illustrates that the supposed benefits of
enlarges judge-made constitutional prohibitions); Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 287
(commenting on "modernist" statutory interpretation which goes beyond legislative intent).
"' See supra notes 113-29 and accompanying text (discussing X-Citement Video dissent's
position on less restrictive alternatives).
'" See Kloppenberg, supra note 5, at 315-17 (citing examples where judicial decrees
were not Court's last word); Friedman, supra note 2, at 644-53 (discussing examples where
judicial decisions were not final word); Katzmann, supra note 40, at 2358 (discussing work
of Melnick and Eskridge explaining legislative success in overturning court rulings).
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avoidance - including deference to Congress and promotion of
dialogue - are often illusory.
C. Federalism Concerns and the Avoidance Canon - Rewriting
State Law in Brockett v. Spokane Arcades
When a federal court hears a constitutional challenge to a
state statute, federalism principles are implicated, as Brockett v.
Spokane Arcades " demonstrates. Decided ten years before X-
Citement Video, the Brockett Court partially invalidated a state
obscenity statute." Although it did not use the avoidance can-
on, the Supreme Court rewrote the state statute to conform to
its precedent." The result was similar to the Court's rewriting
in X-Citement Vueo.'4 Both statutes were held not to violate the
Constitution as construed by the Court, but only after the Court
interpreted the statutes in a way that significantly modified
them." However, Brockett raises additional concerns because
the Court rewrote state rather than federal law. While it may be
difficult to reach agreement on the strength of federal and state
interests, the interplay of interests is relevant in determining
whether to apply the canon.
In Brockett, the State of Washington passed a broadly written
state moral nuisance law. This statute curtailed publication of
materials appealing not only to "shameful," "morbid," or "per-
verted" sexual interests, but also materials appealing to normal,
healthy sexual interests."5 It was challenged on its face in fed-
eral district court within days of enactment. 5' The Ninth Cir-
cuit completely invalidated the law, reasoning that it was uncon-
M 472 U.S. 491 (1985).
116 Id, at 506-07.
4 Id. at 504-05. The Court invalidated the statute "only insofar as the word 'lust' is
taken to include normal interest in sex." I& at 504. Alternatively, the Court could have
excised the word "lust" from the statute if the word referred only to normal sexual interest.
Id. at 505. However, the word "lasciviousness" would still be left intact for regulation of
material appealing to truly prurient sexual interests. Id.
'"' Compare United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464, 472 (1994)
(interpreting term "knowingly" to apply to both nature of material and age of performers)
with Brockett, 472 U.S. at 504 (finding partial invalidation when statute was read to prohibit
normal as well as unhealthy interests).
'9 X-Citement Vdeo, 115 S. Ct. at 472; BrockeU 472 U.S. at 504.
, WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48A.010-.900 (1996).
'' Brockef, 472 U.S. at 491.
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stitutionally overbroad and that it chilled activity protected by
the First Amendment.15 2
Upon review, the Supreme Court found the Ninth Circuit's
facial invalidation of the Washington statute "improvident" be-
cause complete invalidation provided no chance for the state to
apply the statute in a narrow manner.53  Specifically, state
courts (or even state officials charged with prosecuting persons
under the statute) had no opportunity to "save" the statute
through use of the avoidance canon 5' and no chance to inter-
pret it as conforming to the Court's obscenity precedents. 55
The Court noted that Washington courts had previously followed
its precedent and that the Washington legislature had incorpo-
rated much - albeit not all - of this standard into its new
law. 156
In Brockett, the Court reached the same result as in X-Citement
Video - narrowing a statute so as to conform to Supreme Court
First Amendment precedent.'57 The Court accomplished this
' J-R Distribs., Inc. v. Eikenberry, 725 F.2d 482, 493 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, Brocke, 472
U.S. at 507. However, the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's holding in J-R
Distributors, stating that there is nothing in the First Amendment context to require
invalidation of the law. Brockett, 472 U.S. at 502. Although the overbreadth doctrine has
never been explicitly overruled, its vitality has been limited in recent decades. See, e.g.,
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 615 (1973) (barring plaintiffs charged with
violating statute from invoking overbreadth doctrine because their acts were not within
allegedly overbroad portion of statute). Professor Dorf raises issues relating to the Court's
recent approach to facial challenges and the overbreadth doctrine. Dorf, supra note 9, at
294.
' Brocket, 472 U.S. at 501.
" Id. at 502-04. The Court cited other portions of the avoidance doctrine, but not the
avoidance canon. Id. at 501-03. Nonetheless, the result - the narrowed interpretation of a
statute - is an outcome similar to that obtained through traditional use of the avoidance
canon. See infra note 160 and accompanying text (discussing similar concerns in ripeness
cases).
. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-26 (1973) (describing "obscene" materials).
The Court stated that obscene material is that which:
(a) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would
find appeals to the prurient interest; (b) . . . depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law;
and (c) . . . taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientif-
ic value.
I& at 24 (citations omitted).
" See Brockdeu 472 U.S. at 506 n.13 (noting that Washington courts had construed
statute to incorporate Court's obscenity test).
I57 X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 469; Brockett 472 U.S. at 504.
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through partial invalidation rather than by "rewriting" a statute
with reference to the canon.lss The Court stated that "[p]artial
invalidation would be improper if it were contrary to legislative
intent in the sense that the legislature had passed an inseverable
Act or would not have passed it had it known the challenged
provision was invalid." 9 But the Washington statute included a
severability clause, and the Court reasoned that it "would be
frivolous to suggest ... that the Washington Legislature, if it
could not proscribe materials that appeal to normal as well as
abnormal sexual appetites, would have refrained from passing
the moral nuisance statute. " 16
In response to both X-Citement Video and Brockett, legislators
have the option to revise the statute to reflect the Court's inter-
pretation, or to amend the statute to assert the legislature's true
intent. Arguably, redacting a single clause is clearer in terms of
constitutional law because it serves as a micro-constitutional
ruling (i.e., "if we didn't decide you really didn't mean to in-
clude this phrase, we would have to find the whole statute to be
unconstitutional"), but this is an extremely fine distinction. Be-
cause its purpose and effect are virtually indistinguishable from
that of the avoidance canon, partial invalidation could be cate-
gorized as an adjudicatory approach with results similar to the
application of the broad approach to the avoidance canon.
Brocket, 472 U.S. at 506.
l d.
"' Id. at 506-07. In contrast, Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, and Burger in Brocket
advocated yet another approach for avoiding constitutional difficulties while retaining
much of the legislative product. Id. at 507-10 (O'Connor, J., concurring). They suggested
that the federal courts should have abstained under Railroad Comm'n v. Puliman Co., 312
U.S. 496, 508 (1941), rather than reach the constitutional claim. Brockett, 472 U.S. at 508-09
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Troubled by the breadth of the facial challenge brought in
federal court only days after the statute's enactment, the Justices raised concerns similar to
those in ripeness cases. I. at 507 (O'Connor, J., concurring). They believed that the
opportunity for Washington courts to "provide authoritative adjudication of questions of
state law" outweighed the federal court's general duty to adjudicate federal questions
properly before it. Id. at 508 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In rejecting abstention, the Ninth
Circuit had stated that free expression is "always an area of particular federal concern." J-R
Distribs., Inc. v. Eikenberry, 725 F.2d 482, 487-88 (9th Cir. 1984). However, the Supreme
Court rejected this view. Brocket4 472 U.S. at 509-10 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Instead,
the Court stated that, in completely invalidating the statute, the Ninth Circuit had engaged
in "[s]peculation" and "a premature and avoidable interference with the enforcement of
state law in an area of special concern to the States." IM at 510 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Federalism concerns are implicated whenever a federal court
construes a state statute. Using several components of the avoid-
ance doctrine and various abstention techniques, federal courts
frequently defer to state courts, giving them the first chance to
review the scope and validity of state statutes, especially when
the challenged statute has not yet been applied. This permits a
state court to either construe the statute so that it does not raise
federal constitutional issues, or to decide the federal constitu-
tional question in a manner consistent with Supreme Court
precedent, perhaps by severing any unconstitutional provisions.
In short, federalism concerns argue for exhaustion of state
remedies before the federal courts address the constitutionality
of state law. Thus, in her Brockett concurrence, Justice O'Connor
argues that federalism concerns mandate abstention (at least
temporarily) by the federal courts as to the Washington stat-
ute.
161
But federalism concerns compete here with a federal court's
mission to engage in judicial review - to resolve constitutional
challenges and thereby give legal guidance. The Ninth Circuit
directly complied with this duty when it invalidated the Washing-
ton statute in Brockett'62 It provided a lengthy discussion of the
First Amendment designed to guide the legislature in future
revision of the statute.6 3 Federal courts continually define and
state courts continually apply federal constitutional law, particu-
larly in criminal cases. The Constitution defines the minimum
rights of each individual, and a state constitution, statute, or
.judicial decision cannot limit or modify that minimum. Applying
a different standard to state legislative actions as a matter of
prudence seems inconsistent and inappropriate, particularly
when the only significant issue is whether the statute violates the
Federal Constitution. Here, both the Ninth Circuit and the
Supreme Court assume that the statute as written did violate the
First Amendment."n
The Brockett majority chose a middle-ground alternative be-
tween abstention and facial invalidation. The Court partially
's' Brocket, 472 U.S. at 507 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
162 Id. at 495.
161 J-R Distribs., 725 F.2d at 485-87.
"A Brocket, 472 U.S. at 495, 504.
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rewrote the statute, arguing that the state legislature (must
have) intended the new result, one consistent with the Court's
prior precedents. 6 Apparently, the Court believed that a state
court would have reached the same result when it construed the
statute in light of the First Amendment. This adjudicatory move,
with an outcome so similar to the avoidance canon, seems an
odd way to promote deference to states and avoid unnecessary
federal intervention in state law. When broadly applying the
canon in reviewing state statutes, the Court runs the risk of
raising constitutional doubts without defining the parameters of
its concerns or the doctrines involved in resolving such doubts.
At the same time, the Court takes on a quasi-legislative role by
engaging in actual revision of the statute. These acts in them-
selves might raise federalism concerns. When relying on the
canon to rewrite state legislation, the Court fails to fulfill its
central role of directly determining federal constitutional ques-
tions, while arguably intervening too directly in the legislative
function of the state.
In Brockett, the Court does more clearly and directly discuss
First Amendment constraints than in many cases in which it uses
the avoidance canon. But the partial rewriting of the statute in
Brockett, and similar applications of the avoidance canon, cannot
be justified on federalism grounds. Therefore, courts should
carefully scrutinize federalism interests and question whether
rewriting the statute is more deferential than affording the state
legislature an opportunity to make clear its intent after a court
makes clear its understanding of the Constitution.
III. A FAILURE TO APPLY THE CANON IN
OBVIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES
Courts traditionally apply the avoidance canon when they may
construe an ambiguous statute in such a way as to avoid reach-
ing a constitutional issue, particularly when the legislative history
can reasonably support such a construction and it is consistent
with prior Supreme Court precedent. As in X-Citement Video,
frequently the Court has applied the avoidance canon in First
Amendment challenges to narrowly construe the challenged
1 Id. at 506.
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statute and thus avoid the necessity of determining the outer
reaches of the First Amendment.' However, the application of
the avoidance canon in Rust v. Sullivan'67 had a very different
result.
Several years before its decision in X-Citement Video, the Court
eschewed application of the avoidance canon in Rust v.
Sullivan."6 In Rust, the plaintiff's challenge to constitutionally
questionable regulations presented the classic situation in which
the Court has applied the avoidance canon. 169 The statute un-
der which the regulations were issued permitted an interpreta-
tion that would have avoided reaching the constitutional ques-
tion under the broad approach to the canon.7 ' Nonetheless,
the Court selected a narrow version of the canon in order to
reach a contentious and politically volatile constitutional issue:
speech rights concerning abortion.' An attempt to reconcile
the broad application of the canon in X-Citement Video with its
narrow application in Rust highlights how application of the
avoidance canon may be driven by politics.
A. Rust v. Sullivan
Rust demonstrates that the Court engages in constitutional
interpretation when it determines whether the canon applies or
not.7 " Disputing whether the constitutional questions were "se-
rious," Justices in both the majority and dissent interpreted the
Constitution to reach opposite conclusions about the canon's
applicability. 7 ' In contrast to the rest of the court, in her dis-
sent, Justice O'Connor refused to state her position on the mer-
its of the constitutional question, and instead advocated applica-
" See infra Part IV (discussing cases extending free speech protection by construing
statutes narrowly and avoiding First Amendment issues).
167 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
'16 Id. at 191.
169 Id.
'70 Id. at 223-24 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
,7, Id. at 190-91.
172 Id. at 191.
,' Id. at 191, 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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tion of the avoidance canon so that Congress could clarify its
intent regarding the recent regulation.'74
Rust involved a challenge to newly promulgated rules restrict-
ing Title X providers. 75 In Title X of the Public Health Ser-
vice Act,'76 Congress provided funding for family planning clin-
ics to serve low-income women, who frequently face "dispropor-
tionately high rates of teenage pregnancy, infant mortality, and
impaired health."'77 While Title X funds clearly could not be
used to perform abortions," s "the [A]ct made no mention of
restricting abortion counseling."'79 For almost eighteen years,
the regulations authorized Title X providers to give "non-direc-
tive counseling about all available alternatives, including prenatal
care, adoption, and abortion.""' ° Although repeated attempts
were made in Congress to amend the Act to prohibit abortion
counseling, they all failed.''
In 1988, the Secretary of Health and Human Services ("Secre-
tary") promulgated new regulations providing in part that a Title
X project "may not provide counselling concerning the use of
abortion as a method of family planning or provide referral for
abortion as a method of family planning."'82 The new regula-
tions also prohibited a Title X provider from engaging in activi-
ties that "encourage, promote or advocate abortion as a method
of family planning."'s The Secretary noted that the changed
interpretations responded to the political climate, including
'7' Id. at 223-24 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
I7' Id. at 181.
'7 Public Health Service Act, §§ 1002, 1008 (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 300a, 300a-6
(1994)).
' Walter Dellinger, Gag Me with a Rule: Bush and Abortion Counseling, THE NEW
REPuBuc, Jan. 6, 1992, at 14 nn.28-29.
'78 Rust, 500 U.S. at 184. Section 1008 of Title X provides that "[n]one of the funds
appropriated under this subchapter shall be used in programs where abortion is a method
of family planning." Id.
' Dellinger, supra note 177, at 14.
180 /d
. Id. Additionally, during the last portion of President Reagan's second term, his
administration expended tremendous effort to prohibit Title X abortion counseling
through administrative action. Id. Reagan's aide, Gary Bauer, who was the head of a promi-
nent anti-abortion lobbying group, spearheaded the effort. Interview with Garrett Epps,
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law in Eugene, Or. (July 13,
1994).
Rust 500 U.S. at 179.
Id. at 180 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(a) (1989)).
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changed attitudes toward the "elimination of unborn children by
abortion."" These regulations - commonly called the "gag
rules-" - were "an extreme departure" from almost eighteen
years of agency policy, and they "placed a heavy burden on the
fund grantees.""8
B. The Majority's Reliance on the Chevron
Doctrine and Resolution of the Merits
In Rust, the Supreme Court relied upon a narrow approach to
the avoidance canon to find that the newly promulgated regula-
tions were not clearly unconstitutional and therefore the Court
need not apply the canon.'87 Under this approach, the Court
was able to reach the constitutionality of the controversial new
federal regulations and uphold them by a five to four mar-
gin." The plaintiffs, consisting of both Title X grantees and
doctors suing on behalf of themselves and their patients, argued
that the regulations were inconsistent with the plain language of
the statute, which forbid "Title X projects only from performing
abortions."189 The Court rejected the argument that the regula-
tions contravened congressional intent or the statute's plain
language, conceding only that the statutory language is "ambigu-
ous" because it "does not speak directly to the issues of counsel-
"' 53 Fed. Reg. 2923-24 (1988). Note, however, that these changed attitudes had not
permeated Congress such that the proposed Title X amendments restricting abortion
counseling could pass.
185 See, e.g., Carole I. Chervin, The Title X Family Planning Gag Rule: Can the Government
Buy Up Constitutional Rights, 41 STAN, L. REv. 401, 401 (1989) (noting that regulations are
commonly known as "gag rules").
"8 Linda Maher, Government Funding in Title X Projecs: Circumscribing the Constitutional
Rights of the Indigent: Rust v. Sullivan, 29 CAL. W. L. REv. 143, 143 (1992). Maher notes that
the "previous administrative interpretation at first permitted and then required the projects
to provide information about and referrals for abortion." Id. at 149 & n.41.
87 Rust, 500 U.S. at 184.
I's Id. at 192, 201-03. The Rust Court, relying on the Salemo principle, points out that
plaintiffs brought a facial challenge and thus must meet a heavy burden. Id. at 183. The
Salerno principle maintains that a "facial challenge to a legislative act is, of course, the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the act would be valid." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 745 (1987). Professor Dorf challenges the validity of the Salerno principle, arguing that
this rule is problematic for both constitutional and prudential reasons. Dorf, supra note 9,
at 238-39.
1 9 Rust 500 U.S. at 181 (emphasis added).
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ling, referral, advocacy, or program integrity" - the issues to
which the regulations are directed."l All Justices except one
agreed that Title X was ambiguous in this respect.19 The
Court also found that the legislative history of the statute was
ambiguous on these issues.'92
Because the statute was ambiguous as to the challenged regu-
lations, the Court upheld the regulations by relying on the Chev-
ron1s' doctrine of administrative deference. 9  The majority
reasoned that "[t]he Secretary's construction of Title X may not
be disturbed as an abuse of discretion if it reflects a plausible
construction of the plain language of the statute and does not
otherwise conflict with Congress's expressed intent."'95 Because
Congress had not expressed an intent counter to the regulations
in a manner the Court deemed sufficiently clear, it concluded
that the regulations were a permissible construction of Title X
and deferred to the agency's interpretation."9 The Court was
not disturbed by the Agency's reversal of eighteen years of agen-
cy policy because the Secretary had reasonably justified the re-
versal, in part relying on a changed political attitude toward
abortion." Nor was the Court troubled that the Agency acted
upon this perceived change although Congress had failed to
&90 Id. at 184 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300a, 300a-6 (1994)).
9, Iti. at 185; id at 207 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that the
language and history of the statute were clear in prohibiting only conduct, rather than
dissemination of information. Id. at 221 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'12 Id at 185.
"' Chevron U.SA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
' Id. at 842-43. Under Chevron, courts must first interpret the statute under which the
agency acted to determine whether the statute spoke to the precise question at issue. Id. at
842. If Congress did not address the specific issue, or if its intent is ambiguous, the court
will defer to the agency's interpretation if it is based on a permissible construction of the
statute in question. Id. at 843.
For a helpful assessment of the courts' use of the Chevron doctrine, see Merrill, supra
note 74, at 921-1003. Professor Merrill also discusses the Supreme Court's application of
the avoidance canon in Rust, which applied the Chevron doctrine, and Edwardfj DeBartolo
Corp. v. florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Counci/, 485 U.S. 568 (1988), which
used the canon to "trump" the Chevron doctrine. Id at 988-89. For another perspective on
the administrative state, see Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the
Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1513-14 (1992).
195 Rust, 500 U.S. at 184 (citing Chevon, 467 U.S. at 842-43).
" Id. at 185-86.
'9 Id. at 186-87.
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pass numerous bills amending Title X to specifically prohibit
abortion counselling."
After declining to apply the avoidance canon, the Rust majori-
ty concluded that the Secretary's regulations did not offend the
Fifth or First Amendments.' The Court reasoned that the reg-
ulations did not violate the free speech rights of the providers,
their staffs, or Title X patients because the regulations did not
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.2 "° Further, the Court
found that the regulations did not unconstitutionally condition
receipt of Title X funding on the relinquishment of a constitu-
tional right to engage in abortion counseling."0' Reasoning that
the government can choose to fund one constitutionally protect-
ed activity over another (i.e., childbirth over abortion), the
Court also rejected Fifth Amendment challenges to the regula-
tion.' The Court noted that Title X's indigent clients are in
"no worse position than if Congress had never enacted Title
X.
" 203
' Dellinger, supra note 177, at 14. As noted earlier, the regulatory reform was led by
an executive aide associated with a prominent anti-abortion group. See supra note 181 and
accompanying text (discussing Reagan administration's failed efforts to defeat Title X
abortion counselling).
191 Rust, 500 U.S. at 203.
00 Id. at 192-200. The majority reasoned that selective government funding of activities
is acceptable. It held that the government can regulate speech through reasonable time,
place and manner restrictions so long as the government does not condition the accep-
tance of funds on the recipients' willingness to espouse a particular viewpoint. Id. at 194-
200. The Court applied this to the gag rule as follows:
[The government could] selectively fund a program to encourage certain activi-
ties it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an
alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so
doing, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has
merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.
Id. at 193.
Professor Wells argues that this conflation of speech and activity is inconsistent with
the Court's traditional approach of carefully scrutinizing viewpoint-based regulations.
Christina E. Wells, Abortion Counseling as Vice Activity: The Free Speech Implications of Rust v.
Sullivan and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 95 COLUM. L REV. 1724, 1731-32 (1995). More-
over, Wells demonstrates that the gag rule "sought to silence only one side of the discus-
sion concerning legitimate family planning alternatives." Id. at 1730.
20' Rust, 500 U.S. at 191-200.
20 Id. at 200-03.
20 Id. at 203.
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The majority rejected the dissenters' argument that the Court
should apply the canon in order to allow Congress to clarify
whether it intended the statute to permit the gag rules because
the regulations posed serious constitutional questions.' The
majority reasoned that the regulations did not raise sufficiently
"grave and doubtful constitutional questions" to indicate that
Congress intended to preclude their issuance. °5 The Court
held, therefore, that it "need not invalidate the regulations in
order to save the statute from unconstitutionality."'
Significantly, the Rust majority reached the constitutional
questions - determining that plaintiffs' arguments did not "car-
ry the day" - before refusing to apply the more cautious ap-
proach to the canon, thus affirming that they would not have to
find the regulations (if within the permissible scope of the stat-
ute) unconstitutional. 7 In other words, the majority justified not
applying the canon by peeking ahead to the merits and realizing
that five Justices would vote for the constitutionality of the gag
rules. This may be a natural result of the Court's selection of
the narrow approach to the canon rather than the broad ap-
proach. As noted in Part I, the narrow approach provides that if
one reading will be unconstitutional, the constitutionally permissi-
ble reading should be chosen; the broad approach allows avoid-
ance whenever a statute raises serious constitutional doubts.208
Selection of the narrow approach heightens the appearance
that political ideology was the dominant reason for reaching the
constitutional question in Rust. Consideration of political context
surrounding regulations is appropriate under the Chevron doc-
trine because the elected executive branch head appoints agency
heads who implement specific political agendas.' But if politi-
cal agendas raise constitutional doubts, courts should consider
the political context in the initial selection between the narrow
Id. at 204-05 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
2" IM. at 191 (citation omitted).
Id. (emphasis added).
207 id.
2 See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text (discussing various approaches to
avoidance canon).
' Chevron U.SA, Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66
(1984).
19961
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or broad approach to the canon, and in deciding whether to
subsequently use the canon.
C. Opposing Views of the Rust Court's
Use of the Avoidance Canon
The dissenters in Rust criticized the majority for "sidestep-
ping" the avoidance canon in its "zeal" to resolve important
constitutional issues.210 As Justice Blackmun stated, "Whether or
not one believes that these regulations are valid, it avoids reality
to contend that they do not give rise to serious constitutional
questions. "211 It appears indisputable that the dissenters are
correct that the regulations raised a "serious" constitutional
question.212 Federal circuit courts had differed in resolving con-
stitutional challenges to the regulations.2 " Of the three courts
of appeal that heard challenges to the regulations, two had
invalidated them as unconstitutional. 2 '4 Three dissenting Su-
preme Court Justices found the regulations unconstitutional
under the First and Fifth amendments. 215 As Justice Blackmun
noted, "the extent to which the government may attach an oth-
erwise constitutional condition to the receipt of a public bene-
fit . . . implicates a troubled area of our jurisprudence."216
210 Rust, 500 U.S. at 204 (BlackmunJ., dissenting); iii at 220-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
id. at 223-25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Maher, supra note 186, at 146 (stating that
Rust majority misapplied canon).
21 Rust 500 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent identified several
serious constitutional questions. Regulation of abortion-related speech implicated the
.extent to which the Government may attach an otherwise unconstitutional condition to
the receipt of a public benefit" and "the Regulations impose viewpoint-based restrictions
upon protected speech and are aimed at a woman's decision whether to continue or
terminate her pregnancy." Id.; see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989) (reviewing doctrine of unconstitutional conditions). For an
update on viewpoint-based restrictions, see Rosenberger v. Rector & Irsitors of University of
Virginia, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 2516 (1995), which discusses a state's denial of funding for a
christian student organization constituting unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.
212 Rust; 500 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., discussing).
235 Compare Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492, 1506 (10th Cir. 1990)
(Baldock, J., dissenting) (holding that regulations violate First and Fifth Amendments) and
Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 899 F.2d 53, 53 (1st Cir. 1990) (en
banc) (holding new regulations unconstitutional) with New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401,
401 (2nd Cir. 1989) (upholding regulations against constitutional challenge).
214 Rust; 500 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
211 Id. at 207-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
216 1&
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Because the regulations presented an important constitutional
question, the dissenters in Rust urged that the canon should
apply because the statute was ambiguous 17 and it "easily sus-
tain[ed] a constitutionally trouble-free interpretation."1 ' If the
statute was read "to prohibit only the actual performance of abortions
with Title X funds," as the Agency did for nearly eighteen years,
the statute would be constitutional under prior Supreme Court
rulings permitting selective government funding of childbirth
versus abortion." 9 Once the Secretary read the statute as per-
mitting regulation of abortion-related speech between Title X
providers and patients, the dissenters found serious constitution-
220al questions.
2' Id. at 207 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Because they deemed the statute "decidedly
ambiguous," the dissenters urged application of the avoidance canon. Id. In addition, the
Rust dissenters quote Sunstein's discussion of Chevron: "It is thus implausible that, after
Chevron, agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes will prevail even if the
consequence ... is to... raise constitutional doubts." Id. (quoting Sunstein, supra note 20,
at 2113). But not all agree that Tide X was ambiguous about restrictions on abortion
counseling and referral. See, e.g., Maher, supra note 186, at 174-78 (arguing that legislative
history demonstrates intent to make broad-based family planning services, including
abortion counseling, available to indigent women); Dellinger, supra note 177, at 14 (stating
that "sponsors intended that Title X patients would be informed of, and referred to,
appropriate medical services that could be obtained outside the program").
2,8 Rust, 500 U.S. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
21 Id. at 206 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The Justices specifically
referred to Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). Id.
' Id. at 207 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissenters argued that "this is not a
situation in which 'the intention of Congress is revealed too distinctly to- permit us to
ignore it because of mere misgivings as to power.'" Id. (quoting George Moore Ice Cream
Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933)). The Secretary's regulations pressed the limits and
implicated "core constitutional values." The dissenters presumed that the statute would
have been explicit if Congress had intended to press the outer limits of constitutionality.
Rust, 500 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent charged the majority with
rejecting a "constitutionally sound construction in favor of one that is by no means clearly
constitutional." Id. at 206 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Commentators have argued that the Court's perception of abortion is that it is a "vice
activity" comparable to gambling. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 200, at 1725-26 (arguing that by
focusing on economic conduct, Court affords speech insufficient protection and conveys its
.emerging view that abortion is no longer a fundamental right"). The Court sees abortion
protest activity as squarely implicating the First Amendment's protection of "political
speech." Id. at 1762-63. However, Wells points out. that in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992), the Court failed to recognize the First Amendment implications of a state
statute that required in part that health care providers carry the State's anti-abortion
message. Wells, supra note 200, at 1734-39. Linda Maher argues that the regulations also
raise gender discrimination problems because they only impact women. Maher, supra note
186, at 170.
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While Justice O'Connor joined in the dissent's presumption
that the regulations raise serious constitutional problems," she
refused to join Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Stevens to the
extent they dissented from the majority's substantive outcome
on the constitutional issues.' Instead, she advocated using the
canon as a matter of judicial restraint, arguing that the Court
.acts at the limits of its power when it invalidates a law on con-
stitutional grounds."" In her view, "[i]n recognition of our
place in the constitutional scheme, we must act with 'great
gravity and delicacy' when telling a coordinate branch that its
actions are absolutely prohibited absent constitutional amend-
ment.""4 O'Connor's preferred use of the canon would thus
act as a warning signal to Congress and the Secretary, saying in
essence that if they pursue this course, the Court may invalidate
the gag rules.'
2' Rus, 500 U.S. at 223 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
' Id at 223-24 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice O'Connor has refused to
reveal her thoughts on the merits of a constitutional dispute when applying the avoidance
doctrine in other cases. See Kloppenberg, supra note 18, at 1006-11 (discussing benefits of
addressing constitutional violations before litigating other nonconstitutional grounds); see,
e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 24 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (opining that Court should remand case for trial on statutory and regulatory grounds
before addressing constitutional issue).
2 Rust, 500 U.S. at 224 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor noted that:
If we rule solely on statutory grounds, Congress retains the power to force the
constitutional question by legislating more explicitly. It may instead choose to
do nothing. That decision should be left to Congress; we should not tell Con-
gress what it cannot do before it has chosen to do it.
Id.
Additionally, in calling for restraint, O'Connor relied on traditional justifications for
the canon, emphasizing those linked with concerns about the judiciary striking down popu-
lar legislation, particularly when popular action concerns controversial political issues. See
id. (favoring canon of construction which avoids constitutional analysis if Court can make
decision on other grounds); see supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text (discussing basis
and justifications for judicial restraint).
-4 Rust, 500 U.S. at 224 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Adkins v. Children's
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 544 (1923)).
2 Id.; see Marshall, supra note 28, at 502 (arguing that by requiring congressional
consideration of policy's constitutionality, Court could improve both legislative and
adjudicative processes); see genera/ly Rust, 500 U.S. at 224 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Court should not address constitutional questions until Congress first
confronts them and should instead give warnings).
Avoiding Serious Constitutional Doubts
As indicated by the dissenters, if the broad formulation of the
canon were applied to Rust, the constitutional questions raised
by the regulations would be avoided and the statute would be
narrowly construed to prohibit the gag rules. Under the
majority's narrow formulation in Rust, the canon is a barrier to
constitutional adjudication only when the action of other
branches clearly would be unconstitutional. Under such an anal-
ysis, the canon only has force when the actions of other branch-
es are clearly constitutionally deficient on the merits, 6 and
should be of less concern when the Court upholds the constitu-
tionality of agency action as it did in Rust.
The Rust decision illustrates the dangers presented by the
availability of alternate formulations of the canon. Because there
are two versions of the canon, courts are able to sidestep the
canon when, for political reasons, they wish to address the con-
stitutionality of controversial statutes and regulations.' Instead,
courts should base their application of the canon upon explicit
factors aimed at evaluating the costs and benefits of avoidance,
rather than inconsistently and opportunistically selecting between
two very different approaches.
D. Dialogue Ramifications of the Rust
Formulation of the Avoidance Canon
Rust demonstrates that neither side can avoid constitutional
interpretation in determining whether the canon applies; the
majority and dissent just make different judgments about the
constitutionality of the regulations. The Rust Court "previewed"
the merits of the constitutional issues and stated that the avoid-
ance canon did not apply.
In general, the Supreme Court should address constitutional
issues squarely - even controversial, politically sensitive ones. In
Rust, the Court was able to do this because the Justices
"' This explains Justice Brandeis's departure from the avoidance doctrine in Eric RR
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Kloppenberg, supra note 18, at 1050.52.
27 Wells, supra note 200, at 1758-61. The same perception "drove" a number ofJustices
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Id. Furthermore, it may have motivated
those who recently inserted language into the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. §
223 (1996), banning discussion of abortion and other "indecent" material on the Internet.
See Peter H. Lewis, Protest, Cyberspace-Style, for New Law, N.Y. Thmts, Feb. 8, 1996, at A16 (dis-
cussing passage of Communications Decency Act and reactions).
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disagreed over proper formulation of the avoidance canon.
Under the broad formulation, the canon would apply because
the abortion gag rules challenged in Rust raised serious
constitutional doubts. But these rules were not clearly
unconstitutional to five Justices, so by using the narrow
formulation, the Court considered the merits and upheld the
constitutionality of the gag rules. This selective use of the broad
or narrow formulation is troubling. If the Court is going to
retain the canon, it should choose a single version. The narrow
approach is preferable because it would result in less avoidance;
the court would reach the merits in more cases.
So - apart from its outcome on the merits - what is wrong
with the Court reaching the constitutional issue in Rust? In light
of the Court's ruling, Congress could revise Title X to preclude
the new regulations. Indeed, after Rust, Congress did strive to
repudiate the regulations as a misinterpretation of Title X.'
The Senate passed the legislation by a margin of 73 to 25 votes
and the House by 272 to 156 votes.' But President Bush ve-
toed the legislation and Congress narrowly failed to muster the
two-thirds vote necessary to override his veto.2 ' Nonetheless,
the gag rules remained an important political issue, and Presi-
dent Clinton rescinded the regulations by executive order short-
ly after his inauguration in early 1993.23' Thus, the Court's
declaration of the regulations' constitutionality spurred long-
term political dialogue and reaction on the issue.'
In Rust, the Court fulfilled its important function of deciding
constitutional questions. While this aspect of the decision is
positive, Rust clearly indicates that the Court does not apply the
canon consistently in determining which constitutional issues to
reach. The divergence in approaches to the canon between the
2 Dellinger, supra note 177, at 14. The legislation was the Family Planning
Amendments Act. See S. Res. 323, 102d Cong., 138 CONG. REc. S15157-02 (1992)
(extending and amending Federal Family Planning Program under Title X of Public
Health Service Act) (unenacted).
2 Dellinger, supra note 177, at 3.
"0 l&; see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 5, at 169-70 (examining political shifts giving rise to
gag rule).
"' See Maher, supra note 186, at 179 n.227 (acknowledging President Clinton's
rescission of gag rule); Title X "Gag Rulek ", 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 87-88 (Jan. 22,
1993) (suspending gag rule).
232 ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTrrrTION IN CONFLmcr 361-62 (1992).
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Court in X-Citement Video on one hand and Rust on the other
underscores this inconsistency.
An additional factor may have influenced the Court's use of
the narrow formulation of the canon in Rust. This case raised
abortion issues as well as free speech issues. The Court's juris-
prudence in the abortion arena comprises contradictory applica-
tions of the avoidance doctrine which appear politically motivat-
ed and results-oriented.33 Therefore, the majority's selection of
the narrow version of the canon in Rust may be merely a politi-
cal exercise related to the zeal of five Justices to reach the mer-
its and affirm the gag rules.23 The Court's invocation of the
narrow formulation, however, may encourage other courts to
apply the canon in a very limited manner and decide the merits
of more constitutional challenges. This is likely to increase con-
fusion for lower courts considering the canon's various formula-
tions.
Further, avoidance - or at least selection of the broad, "seri-
ous doubts" formulation - seems more appropriate in Rust than
in many cases because the new regulations posed a serious con-
stitutional question under the Court's precedent."ss As Justice
' Despite the Court's much hailed and much decried recognition of
constitutionalizing abortion rights in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court has
frequently used avoidance techniques in abortion challenges. For example, in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Serws., 492 U.S. 490 (1989), the Court employed and vigorously debated
the rule of measured constitutional steps. See id. (demonstrating Justices' inconsistent views
relating to constitutionality of abortion laws); see also Kloppenberg, supra note 5, at 306-11
(discussing Webster's inconsistent approaches to rule of measured steps). In Webster, five
Justices construed the viability testing provision to save the statute from constitutional
infirmity, relying on the avoidance canon. Webster, 492 U.S. at 513-15. Additionally, in a
criminal case prior to Roe, the Court used the avoidance canon to deflect a constitutional
ruling on abortion rights. See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70 (1971) (stating that
courts should construe statutes whenever possible so as to uphold constitutionality).
"The Supreme Court's recent flamboyant disregard of [the avoidance canon] in
Rust... in all probability reflects less a weakening of the norm than a weakening of the
commitment to Roe v. Wade...." Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets and Scarlet Letters: The
Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 124 n.331
(1991). See also Marshall, supra note 28, at 491 (inferring that Supreme Court refused to
apply avoidance doctrine but chose interpretation that does not implicate constitutional
issues); Merrill, supra note 74, at 1032 (criticizing mandatory deference model's concept of
implied delegation). In a decision reached shortly after Rust, the Court's division over its
commitment to Roe is reflected even as it reaffirms some core of Roe. See Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992) (reaffirming Roe, yet upholding
constitutionality of Pennsylvania abortion laws).
' See Marshall, supra note 28, at 491 (explaining that Rust Court relied on statute's
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O'Connor argued, Congress was not afforded a sufficient oppor-
tunity to clarify its intent - to force the constitutional ques-
tion.2" And clarification was appropriate because Congress had
repeatedly failed to modify Title X to prohibit abortion counsel-
ing prior to enactment of the regulations. Thus, this is one of
the few cases where the agency-executive-congressional interac-
tion on this divisive political issue could justify a broader avoid-
ance canon. Nonetheless, the Court intervened in the political
controversy in Rust, supporting an end-run around Congress's
repeated rejections of Title X amendments and shifting power
to the executive branch and the agency. The broad approach to
the avoidance canon arguably should have been used to "re-
mand" the issue to Congress for further explication of intent
and constitutional deliberation.3 7
Finally, Rust demonstrates the difficulties implicit in the appli-
cation of the avoidance canon in the context of administrative
law cases governed by the Chevron doctrine.ss Professor Thom-
as Merrill sees the multiple canons of statutory construction as
"a potentially important qualification of the Chevron framework,"
affording courts some flexibility in terms of deference to agency
action.3 9 In particular, he demonstrates that the Court applied
ambiguous language to invoke Chevron deference which served to displace avoidance
canon). Although Professor Marshall is not a great fan of the canon, he argues that it
might be useful in limited circumstances. For example, "if two competing constructions are
truly of relatively equal plausibility then the goal of avoiding a difficult constitutional issue
is as good a reason as any, and a better reason than most, for choosing one interpretation
over another." Id. Marshall concludes that although Rust fits within that situation, the
Court refused to apply the avoidance canon there. Id.
' Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 224 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
2 /71
Two labor cases also raise interesting examples of the Court's use of the avoidance
canon to trump the Chevron doctrine in the First Amendment context. Shortly before Rust,
the Court in Edward J DeBartolo Corp. v. lorida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988), refused to defer to a NLRB construction of the National
Labor Relations Act. The agency's construction raised free speech issues relating to union
handbilling activities at a shopping mall. Id. at 575-76. The Court stated that courts should
not defer to agency interpretations (even reasonable ones) which pose serious
constitutional questions assuming another reasonable interpretation of the statute is possi-
ble. Id. at 575-77. Similarly, the Court in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979),
construed the same Act to deny the NLRB's jurisdiction over lay faculty at parochial
schools, absent a clear expression of congressional intent, because such jurisdiction would
implicate the religion clauses of the First Amendment. Id. at 507.
239 Merrill, supra note 74, at 988. Merrill suggested that although the status of the
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the canon of avoiding serious constitutional doubts to "trump"
the Chevron doctrine in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Forida Gulf
Coast Building & Construction Trades Council,4 when an agency
interpretation of a statute raised "serious constitutional ques-
tions" implicating free speech rights. 4' In Edward J. DeBartolo,
rather than simply interpreting the statute to determine whether
it was ambiguous under the first step of Chevron,24 the Court
asked whether it could avoid serious constitutional doubts by
interpreting the statute to avoid the agency's questionable inter-
pretation of the statute. 43  Merrill contrasts the Edward J
DeBartolo Court's use of the broad, "serious doubts" formulation
of the canon with the Rust Court's invocation of the canon's
narrow approach. Merrill suggests that Rust "arguably can be
read as limiting the [avoidance] canon to cases in which the
agency interpretation would be unconstitutional, as opposed to
merely raising a 'serious question' of constitutionality."2"
Merrill's discussion of Edward J DeBartolo and Rust is helpful
to illuminate the clash between these two judicial self-abnegation
(i.e., deference) techniques. But rather than reformulating the
canon, a more apt description of the Rust decision is that the
Court chose the narrow approach to the canon over the broad
approach. The Court returned subsequently to the broad ap-
proach of the canon in X-Citement Video. Therefore, the narrow
formulation in Rust may just be an indicator of the canon's
malleability. The Court's manipulation of the canon is evidenced
by its failure to apply a single version of the canon consistently
multiple canons is unclear under the Chevron framework, the canons and his theory of
.executive precedent" may provide some flexibility for dealing with Chevron's mandated all-
or-nothing form of deference to administrative agencies. See id. at 988-89, 1023 (suggesting
that certain canons of construction may trump Chevron doctrine); cf Sunstein, supra note
20, at 2113 (arguing that Chevron itself be treated as canon).
-4 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
241 ld. at 588. "[T]he Court in effect held that the result suggested by Chevron was
trumped by the result suggested by the canon .... [T]he Court used the canon to oust
the Chevron framework altogether." Merrill, supra note 74, at 988; see also supra text
accompanying notes 198-201 (suggesting that certain canons of statutory construction may
trump Chevron doctrine if necessary to avoid constitutional doubts).
242 See supra note 194 (discussing Chevron's method of statutory interpretation).
243 Edwardj. DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 577.
244 Id. at 577 n.87. Three Justices found that the agency interpretation in Rust was
unconstitutional; this established for Merrill that it raised "serious constitutional doubts."
Merrill, supra note 74, at 989.
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where a statute is ambiguous and one interpretation poses a
serious constitutional question."
Although the Court addressed the regulation's constitutional-
ity, Rust is one of those rare cases in which avoidance was ap-
propriate for several reasons. First, the Court deferred to a re-
cent agency interpretation that appeared to directly contravene
the intent of Congress and a longstanding prior agency interpre-
tation. Second, the regulations were the Executive's end-run
around Congress to further a political agenda which had failed
in Congress; their promulgation implicates serious separation of
powers concerns. Finally, by applying the canon, the Court
would reinforce its own constitutional interpretations and effec-
tuate the apparent intent of Congress until Congress forces the
constitutional question by pushing the limits of constitutionality.
In contrast, the Court has applied the canon frequently in the
First Amendment context when the costs of avoidance were
greater than those in Rust. The next Part considers cases involv-
ing criminal prosecutions under the Smith Act ' and the Fed-
eral Registration of Lobbying Act.247 These cases demonstrate
the problems of avoidance and inconsistent approaches to the
canon. The analyses of these cases delineates further factors that
courts should consider in determining whether avoidance is
appropriate.
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AVOIDANCE, AND THE
COMMUNIST THREAT
This Part explores two sets of cases in which the Supreme
Court avoided constitutional questions raised by significant en-
croachments on political speech and association rights of
245 Despite the Court's rhetoric about the wisdom and prudence of the canon, it has
ignored the canon in other situations. See, e.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-
80 (1938) (disapproving avoidance doctrine to reach constitutional question); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179-80 (1803) (establishing Court's duty to interpret and
uphold Constitution, although it could have simply construed congressional act); ESKRIDGE,
supra note 5, at 287 (discussing Court's inconsistent approach to canon).
2 See infra Part IVA (discussing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) and Yates
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), overruled on other grounds by Burks v. United States,
437 U.S. 1 (1978)).
247 See infra Part IV.C (discussing United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) and
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954)).
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minority political groups in the 1950s. The volatile political
environment and precarious position of the Court during this
time clearly influenced the Court's approach to these cases."4
In several of these cases, the Court avoided a direct confronta-
tion with Congress through use of the canon.249 Nonetheless,
this Article questions whether the Court's avoidance was appro-
priate and whether that avoidance promoted or restrained the
evolution of and dialogue about the scope of First Amendment
protection.
The costs of avoidance in this unstable and sensitive context
were high, for political speech is most vulnerable during times
of war or threat from foreign nations and political movements.
At such times, the non-majoritarian Court should explicitly de-
fine constitutional limits to prevent encroachment by the
majoritarian branches. Nonetheless, through its use of the avoid-
ance canon in free speech cases in the 1950s, the Court failed
to protect targeted groups from majoritarian incursions on
speech rights and failed to define clear constitutional bound-
aries.
The Court's use of the avoidance canon during this period
contributed to confusion and uncertainty in First Amendment
law.' By "tiptoeing" around speech incursions with the avoid-
ance canon rather than directly condemning them, the Court
impoverished us as a polity. By using the avoidance canon as a
back door, the Court was less than intellectually honest in its
constitutional adjudication. The Court, as well as other constitu-
tional actors, has the duty to engage in the difficult, politically
148 See DAVID CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR: THE ANTI-COMMUNIST PURGE UNDER TRUMAN
AND EISENHOWER 157 (1978) ("More than seventy bills were introduced into the 84th Con-
gress to curb the powers of the Court. So furious was the backlash that during the first
session of the 85th Congress... 101 anti civil-liberties bills were introduced, compared
with only eight designed to reinforce civil liberties"); Kreimer, supra note 234, at 23-24 n.62
(explaining confrontation between 1958 Congress and Supreme Court regarding Court's
power to construe statutes to preempt state regulation and Court's power over internal
security issues).
.. Kreimer, supra note 234 at 23-24. Professor Kreimer argues that the Court could
have conceivably achieved greater protection of civil liberties "by couching libertarian re-
sults in less controversial values that could mobilize broader support." Id.
21 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 505. For example, although the Court greatly extended protec-
tion of political speech in Yates, it did so by narrowly construing the statute and the prece-
dent established in Dennis, which had recognized only minimal protections of potentially
seditious speech. Yates, 354 U.S. at 308.
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volatile and socially sensitive debate concerning how much pro-
tection the Constitution affords to dissenters in times of cri-
sis." l The Communist Party and Lobbying Act cases demon-
strate how the avoidance canon serves to make constitutional law
in an indirect and confusing manner.
Explicit modern restrictions on freedom of speech and associ-
ation originated in the Espionage and Sedition Acts of World
War I."s These Acts subordinated freedom of expression to
the social "benefits" of patriotism and willingness to sacrifice for
war.253 The Supreme Court sustained convictions of Communist
and Socialist political leaders - including presidential candidate
Eugene V. Debs - under these statutes, holding that if speech
tended to promote bad results, it could be punished.' In the
1930s, the Court began to strike down state anti-sedition laws
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, for the first time
ruling in favor of members of the Communist Party.255 Howev-
er, the enactment of the Smith Act in 1940 marked the be-
' See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1951) (discussing avoidance
of constitutional adjudication in sensitive areas of social policy). "[S] ocietal attitudes toward
speech can be counted on to expand and fold accordion-like, and to fold at the most cru-
cial and inopportune times." William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a
Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 91, 93 (1984).
2 Espionage Act, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1917); Sedition Act, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (1918);
see also GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE, 151-63 (discussing
Court's interpretation of Espionage Act).
First Amendment decisions by the Supreme Court have generally taken the view that
individual rights of freedom of expression and association may in some situations be subor-
dinated to other societal interests. SeeJOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw § 16.12 (5th ed. 1995); see, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasizing that in order to suppress free speech and
right to assembly, one must demonstrate reasonable grounds and imminent danger).
25 See Yosal Rogat & James M. O'Fallon, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion - The
Speech Cases, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1349, 1368-78 (1984) (discussing Debs v. United States, 249
U.S. 211, 215-17 (1919), Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209-10 (1919), and
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 50-53 (1919)); see also Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand
and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV.
719, 735-41 (discussing Frohwerk, Schenck, and Court's conviction of Eugene Debs under
Espionage Act). In his discussion of Debs, Gunther cites Harry Kalven, Professor Ernst Frend
and Debs v. United States, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 235, 237 (1973), as reminding us that Debs's
conviction was "somewhat as though George McGovern had been sent to prison for his
criticism of the [Vietnam] War." Gunther, supra, at 739.
" See Marc Rohr, Communists and the First Amendment: The Shaping of Freedom of Advocacy
in the Cold War Era, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1, 7-9 (1991) (citing Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S.
242 (1937), and DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)).
' Smith Act, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2385
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ginning of increasing limitations on political expression and
association and a shift from state to federal prosecutions of sedi-
tion."' With the entry of the United States into World War II,
followed by the Cold War, freedom of expression was again
tightly restricted.s
In 1951, the Supreme Court first considered the Smith Act's
First Amendment ramifications and, in Dennis v. United States,'
allowed broad restrictions on political speech.'W Six years later,
in Yates v. United States,261 the Court used the avoidance canon
to reinterpret Dennis, extending greater protection to political
speech through statutory construction rather than by directly
addressing the constitutional question of whether this speech
could be restricted.2 This shift toward a more expansive inter-
pretation of the First Amendment succeeded in protecting some
targeted groups from majoritarian incursions on free speech
rights. However, in failing to reach the constitutional question in
Yates, the Court also failed to clearly define the scope of consti-
tutional rights.
(1996)).
27 See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 259 (1961) (affirming convictions of
Communist Party leaders whose activities presented clear and present danger); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951) (affirming conviction for conspiracy to organize
Communist Party to teach and advocate overthrow of government by force and violence);
Bary v. United States, 248 F.2d 201, 203 (10th Cir. 1957) (holding that'prohibition of advo-
cacy and teaching of overthrow of government by force and violence is constitutional be-
cause of clear and present danger even though no actual attempt to overthrow).
a See GUNTHER, supra note 252, at 348 (describing America's attitude).
During the [First World War], persecution of dissidents was perhaps to be
expected, although Hand had condemned it even then, but the greater hyste-
ria that gripped the nation in the postwar years was far more troubling. All
over the country, strikes and bombing made many Americans imagine that the
shadow of the Russian Revolution was lurking on domestic soil and that the
'Red Menace' should be countered.
Id. Gunther then quoted a letter from Hand in which he stated the "merry sport of Red-
baiting goes on .... [T]he skies have a rather sinister appearance." Id. at 348-49 (quoting
letter from Learned Hand, district judge, to Oliver Holmes, Supreme Court Justice, dated
Nov. 25, 1919).
2- 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
21 See id. at 495-96, 516-17 (finding that political speech can be constitutionally restrict-
ed under Smith Act).
263 354 U.S. 298 (1957), overruled on other grounds by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1
(1978).
212 Id. at 324-27.
University of California, Davis
The Yates Court's failure to address the constitutional issue
was particularly problematic because the Court modified but did
not overrule Dennis."t3 As a result of the Supreme Court invok-
ing the broad approach to the avoidance canon in Yates, the
constitutionally permissible restrictions on free speech allowed by
Dennis still stand. Ideally, courts should consistently reach the
constitutional questions presented, thereby eliminating the prob-
lem of leaving questionable precedent on the books. However, if
courts do apply the canon, they should do so consistently, so
that if a statute raises a constitutional question, that question
will be avoided by all courts ruling on that constitutional issue
in the same or similar circumstances.
The second set of cases addressed in this Part arose under
the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act!' and its correspond-
ing congressional investigations. These cases reached the Court
in the mid-1950s. The first case involved a challenge to a con-
tempt of Congress citation against a socialist organization for
refusing to disclose its membership list.2" Rather than reach
the First Amendment issue, the Court chose to construe the
statute narrowly, holding that a committee had exceeded its
delegated authority."' The Court's narrow construction of "lob-
bying activities" in this politically charged case was again used a
year later in United States v. Harris,267 where the Court almost
completely revised the Lobbying Act. The Court used the avoid-
ance canon to constrain congressional activities, while avoiding
direct confrontation with Congress over the Act's constitutional-
ity. However, this narrow and distorted construction limited the
scope of the Lobbying Act to the point of ineffectiveness."
Despite the Court's substantial reinterpretation of the Lobbying
Act, the Act remained as construed in Harriss until 1996."6
'6 See id. at 308 (distinguishing, but not overruling, Dennis).
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 839 (1946) (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 261 (1994)).
'2 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 42 (1953).
26 Id. at 45-46.
267 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
268 See, e.g., Andrew P. Thomas, Easing the Pressure on Pressure Groups: Toward a Constitu-
tional Right to Lobby, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 149, 158-66, 180-82 (1993) (tracing history
of lobbyists' rights).
2' Lobbying Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (1995).
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The published statute was inconsistent with its judicially con-
structed "meaning" for thirty years.
A. History of the Communist Membership and Advocacy Cases
The Supreme Court consistently upheld convictions of Ameri-
can Communists for political speech and party membership
under the Smith Act during World War II and the Cold War,
finding no violation of First Amendment rights. 7' In interpret-
ing the Smith Act, the Court applied a modified "clear and
present danger" test27' under which convictions were almost
invariably upheld. Dennis v. United States directly addressed the
constitutionality of the Act and is generally considered the ex-
emplar of the broad application of this test. Six years later, in
Yates v. United States, the Court applied the avoidance canon to
retreat somewhat from Dennis, saying that its legislative history
clearly showed that Congress "aimed [the Smith Act] at the
advocacy and teaching of concrete action for forcible overthrow
of the Government, and not at principles divorced from ac-
tion." m The Dennis-Yates line of cases and their significance to
First Amendment jurisprudence has been extensively re-
viewed." This Part examines the Court's use of statutory con-
"' The Smith Act imposes fines or imprisonment up to 20 years for knowingly
advocating or helping a group that advocates "the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety
of overthrowing... [the] government in the United States by force or violence" or for
becoming a member "of any such society [or] group... knowing the purposes
thereof...." 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1994). SeeYates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 327 (1957)
(stating that First Amendment was not violated), overruled on other grounds by Burks v.
United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516 (1951)
(holding no violation of First Amendment because of indefiniteness).
" Dennis 341 U.S. at 509 (finding that Smith Act does not inherently violate First
Amendment and that "clear and present danger" extends to both speech that advocates
future overthrow of government and actions to overthrow that are clearly "doomed from
the outset").
272 Yates, 354 U.S. at 319-20.
See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 234, at 22-35 (tracing development of narrowly
construing statutes requiring disclosure of political activities); Sheldon L. Leader, Free Speech
and The Advocacy of Illegal Action in Law and Political Theory, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 412, 414
(1982) (tracing distinction between advocacy of illegal action that is remote from concrete
action and advocacy of illegal action that produces imminent action); David M. Rabban,
The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1349-50 (1983)
(describing Dennis as both apex and turning point of Court's reliance on clear and present
danger test); Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In
Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1159, 1171-75 (1982) (indicating that
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struction to avoid constitutional questions and considers the
effects of avoidance on constitutional law's development and
constitutional dialogue.
This analysis will begin with a discussion of Masses Publishing
Co. v. Patten,"4 a trial court case from the World War I era
Communist prosecutions. In Masses, Judge Learned Hand used
the avoidance canon to construe narrowly an act similar to the
Smith Act. That case illustrates the gradually developing First
Amendment interpretations and the effects of avoidance in the
context of politically sensitive speech. It also highlights the dis-
tinction between use of the avoidance canon by lower courts
and the Supreme Court.
1. "The Masses Alternative"
Judge Hand's First Amendment jurisprudence and use of the
canon in Masses are difficult to criticize. Hand extended relative-
ly broad protection to the challenged speech, without reaching
the constitutional question concerning the Act itself.
2Y5
Thoughtful scholars praise "the Masses Alternative" as a precur-
sor to the later development of a doctrine more protective of
free speech than that used by the Court during World War I.
They also praise Hand's use of the avoidance canon to link
concerns for preserving free speech to concerns for preserving
the democratic foundations of government.27b While the Masses
alternative did begin a fifty year long attempt to settle the law
of political expression, it did so by pretending not to reach the
constitutional issues involved.
Dennis changed structure of clear and present danger test and describing its consistency
with Yates); Rohr, supra note 255, at 19-22 (examining Dennis and Yates as they relate to
American Communists).
274 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rv'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
275 Masses, 244 F. at 538. Judge Hand noted that the question was solely "how far Con-
gress after much discussion has up to the present time seen fit to exercise a power which
may extend to measures not yet even considered . . . ." Id.
276 See. e.g., GUNTHER, supra note 252, at 158 (praising Masses both for First Amendment
jurisprudence content and for Learned Hand's skill at avoiding constitutional question);
Rogat & O'Fallon, supra note 254, at 1382-83 (stating that "just because law was to be taken
seriously, as a mediation of the passions of the moment, Hand could rest his effort to pro-
tect dissent not on a constitutional ruling, but on a carefully crafted statutory interpreta-
tion").
[Vol. 30:1
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In 1917, the Postmaster of New York notified publishers of
The Masses that the Espionage Act would bar the July issue from
the mail. 77 Judge Learned Hand, in Masses Publishing Co. v.
Patten, 2 7  enjoined the Postmaster from excluding the revolu-
tionary journal from the mails.279 This particular issue of The
Masses contained cartoons280 and commentary depicting Emma
Goldman and others as heroes and martyrs for their imprison-
ment for opposing the military draft, and praised conscientious
objectors"1 - hardly what would today constitute revolutionary
or seditious advocacy. Based on these materials, the Postmaster
charged The Masses with two violations of the Espionage Act.
282
The first violation addressed in Masses related to the prohibi-
tion against making "false statements with intent to interfere
with the operation or success of the military . .. or to promote
the success of its enemies. " 28 Although Hand acknowledged
that the cartoons might be harmful to the war effort, he rea-
soned that such potential harm was irrelevant to whether they
involved a willfully false statement284 Since the cartoons assert-
ed opinions that the creators no doubt believed, and Congress
could not have intended to ban all propaganda, Hand found
that the cartoons did not fall under the prohibition of the
Act.'s
The Postmaster asserted that simply "to arouse discontent and
disaffection among the people with the prosecution of the war
The Espionage Act of 1917 made it an offense to mail seditious publications, de-
fined as those that make false reports or statements with the intent to interfere with the
success of the U.S. military or promote its enemies. Espionage (Barbour) Act, ch. 30, 40
Stat. 217 (1917). With more distance from the passions of war, the relatively mild nature of
the challenged materials becomes apparent
27 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
Masses, 244 F. at 543.
Judge Hand's opinion describes the challenged political cartoons, which questioned
the draft law, the purposes of the war, connections between Congress and business inter-
ests supporting the war efforts and the motives of the United States and allied nations. Id.
at 541-42; see also GUNTHER, supra note 252, at 155 (providing descriptions of political car-
toons at issue in Masses).
2" Masses, 244 F. at 541; see Rogat & O'Fallon, supra note 254, at 1379 (juxtaposing
Hand's position in Masses with that of Justice Holmes).
212 Masses, 244 F. at 538.
2" Id. at 539.
284 J.
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and with the draft tends to promote a mutinous and insubordi-
nate temper among the troops." He further asserted that the
newspaper violated the clause that prohibits "willfully causing
insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty in the
military or naval forces of the United States."' However, in
Hand's analysis, "to interpret the word 'cause' so broadly would
involve necessarily as a consequence the suppression of all hos-
tile criticism. [Further, it would] contradict the normal assump-
tion of democratic government." 7 Thus, while assuming that
Congress may have the power to so limit dissent, "its exercise is
so contrary to the use and wont of our people that only the
clearest expression of such a power justifies the conclusion that it was
intendedL" M
Hand acknowledged the necessity of restricting speech during
wartime, while emphasizing throughout his opinion the crucial
distinction between direct and indirect advocacy and that toler-
ance of political speech is a foundation of* democracy. ' 9 He
"construe[ed] the [Act], so far as it restrains public utter-
ance, . . . as therefore limited to the direct advocacy."' ° With
this construction, Hand narrowed the question to "whether any
of the challenged matter may be said to advocate resistance to
the draft." 9' Hand's rhetoric thus called on democratic val-
ues - the common cultural assumptions of "our people" -
without directly construing the Constitution or directly condemn-
ing Congress and those seeking to restrict mailing of The Mass-
es.9
Commentators have praised Hand's Masses opinion for its
symbolic import and for affording broader protection to political
"8 Id.
2" Id. at 539-40 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 540 (emphasis added).
88 Id. Judge Hand states that while "[p]olitical agitation, by the passions it arouses or
the convictions it engenders, may in fact stimulate men to the violation of law, [it cannot
be assimilated] with direct incitement to violent resistance" without disregarding the tolerance
of free speech that exists in peacetime as a foundation of free government. Id. (emphasis
added).
I8 d. at 541.
' Id. at 540.
See Schacter, supra note 65, at 648 (discussing elucidation of democratic values
through statutory construction); see also Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1007-08 (indicating that
through statutory construction, courts can and should develop public values).
[Vol. 30:1
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dissenters in the midst of wartime pressures."5 Because Hand
sat in Masses as a trial judge construing a recent statute in 1917,
his use of the avoidance canon is more defensible than the Su-
preme Court's avoidance in Yates in 1957. Both provided won-
As Gunther notes: "It was a remarkable decision - remarkable even decades later;
especially remarkable given the practical and doctrinal climate of the times, so strikingly
inhospitable to dissent. Radicals preaching pacifism, conscientious objection, or worse,
were anathema in wartime America." Gunther, supra note 254, at 724 (citing ZACHARIAH
CHAFEE, THIRTY-FIVE YEARS WITH FREEDOM OF SPEECH 4-7 (1952)). According to Professor
Gunther, Hand carefully crafted Masses, conscious of its import and at some personal cost.
GUNTHER, supra note 252, at 152. Hand was often perceived as a radical thereafter, and the
clamor over the decision apparently affected his chances for elevation to the Second Cir-
cuit at that time and later to the Supreme Court. Id. Although Hand's usual judicial ap-
proach was heavily influenced by Thayer's rule of reason, and he had formulated some-
thing like his own avoidance doctrine, in Masses, Hand championed the federal judge's
duty to protect unpopular minorities from constitutionally troubling incursions on political
participation. Id, at 51, 155, 222. Hand commented about his decision in Masses.
I must do the right as I see it and the thing I am most anxious about is that I
shall succeed in giving a decision absolutely devoid of any such considerations
[as the prospect of promotion]. There are times when the old bunk about an
independent and fearless judiciary means a good deal. This is one of them;
and if I have limitations of judgment, I may have to suffer for it, but I want to
be sure that these are the only limitations and that I have none of character.
Id. at 155 (quoting letter from Hand to Frances A. Hand, dated July 16, 1917). Professor
Murchison might praise Hand's use of the canon as a voice of judicial independence so
necessary during times of political crisis. See generally, Murchison, supra note 1, at 169 (stat-
ing that judicial individualism demonstrated in use of avoidance canon amounted to mod-
est, non-authoritative dialogue).
At the time of Masses, squaring the Espionage Act against the First Amendment was an
issue of first impression. Because this was the first case arising under the Act and because
the Supreme Court had no precedent directly on point, Hand felt greater freedom to
speak to the constitutional values implicated by the statute. GUNTHER, supra note 252, at
152-53. While Hand did not directly condemn the constitutionality of the Act, he protected
speech more broadly than the Second Circuit believed was appropriate. See Masses Publ'g
Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917) (reversing District Court's decision in Masses).
Hand also protected speech more broadly than the Supreme Court did in its subse-
quent cases construing the Espionage Act. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
623-24 (1919) (holding that speech against U.S. government is illegal); Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211,-215-17 (1919) (ruling that speech preventing recruiting is punish-
able); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209-10 (1919) (holding that newspaper's
conspiracy to obstruct was within Espionage Act); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 50-
53 (1919) (ruling that evidence seized was admissible).
For Masses, the victory was only temporary. Hand's injunction was immediately stayed
by CircuitJudge Charles Hough, 245 F. 102 (2d Cir. 1917). Thereafter, Hand's ruling was
overturned by the Second Circuit in an opinion which flatly rejected his voicing of constitu-
tional concerns. Masses, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917); see also GUNTHER, supra note 252, at 160-
61 (discussing response to Hand's Masses decision).
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derful rhetoric about core democratic and constitutional values,
but they did not clearly establish constitutional law. But Mass-
es - read in conjunction with the Dennis-Yates line of cases -
also illustrates the costs of avoidance. Hand did not pronounce
a constitutional command in Masses, he did not engage in
"lawsaying" in the Marbuty v. Madison 4  tradition. Instead,
Hand's discussion of constitutional concerns in Masses created a
"phantom norm" or "penumbra" which only became integrated
into First Amendment doctrine much later.'
Although initially applying a significantly more restrictive view
of First Amendment rights, the Supreme Court gradually incor-
porated Hand's conception of protection for political speech
into its standards for determining what is a reasonable "abridg-
ment of freedom of expression for the benefit of society."' 6
Between World War I and the Court's 1969 decision in
Brandenburg v. Ohio,' these standards evolved from the amor-
phous "bad tendency" analysis" 8 to expansive interpretations of
the Holmes-Brandeis "clear and present danger" test.' The
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2 Motomura has argued in another context that avoiding constitutional questions
through the canon in fact changes the constitutional analysis, thereby creating "phantom
norms." Motomura, supra note 51, at 561.
Judge Posner calls this phenomenon a "penumbra" of constitutional law developed by
the courts through the avoidance canon. Posner, supra note 53, at 816. Posner criticizes the
"penumbra" as it extends the already "extraordinarily far-reaching" Constitution. Id,
The practical effect of interpreting statutes to avoid raising constitutional ques-
tions is therefore to enlarge the already vast reach of constitutional prohibition
beyond even the most extravagant modem interpretation of the Constitution
- to create a judge-made constitutional "penumbra" that has much the same
prohibitory effect as the judge-made (or at least judge-amplified) Constitution
itself. And we do not need that.
Id. Posner suggests that the canons promote judicial activism while giving the appearance
of restraint. Id.
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 253, at 957.
395 U.S. 444 (1969).
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668-72 (1925) (rendering clear and present
danger test inapplicable and arguing that state legislature has discretion to take reasonable
measures to protect public peace and safety); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating that only present danger or intent to bring about
immediate evil warrants congressional legislation limiting free speech). Nowak and Rotun-
da note that "[d]isquieting echoes of the majority's bad tendency test [in Abrams] are
found in Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981)." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 253, at 959
n.15.
' Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes, in his dissent, ar-
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test then evolved into a more restrictive "balancing test," which
assessed the seriousness of the danger threatened by the speech,
discounted by its imminence.' In its final state, the test set
forth the more speech protective principles set out in
Brandenburg.°"
The Dennis-Yates line of cases illustrates the influence of
Hand's phantom norm on First Amendment standards. Although
gued for the first time that in order to uphold a conviction for political speech a "present
danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about" must be shown. Id. at 628
(Holmes, J., dissenting). See also Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 256 (1937) (adopting
clear and present danger as appropriate test); Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919) (asserting that circumstances are relevant to whether speech is accorded First
Amendment protection); Gunther, supra note 254, at 735 (stating that Holmes's phrase
"clear and present danger" became commonplace in Court's opinions); Hans A. Linde,
"Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 1163, 1165-73 (1970) (tracing changes in "clear and present danger" test from Dennis
and Yates to Brandenburg); Bernard Schwartz, Justice Brennan and the Brandenburg Decision
- A Lawgiver in Action, 79 JuDIcATURE 24, 26-27 (July-Aug. 1995) (providing overview of
development of "clear and present danger" test through 1969 Brandenburg decision).
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 519 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see
generally, Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theoy of the First Amendment, 72 YALE LJ.
877, 912-14 (1963) (criticizing ad hoc balancing test as untenable legal doctrine).
"' Gunther, supra note 254, at 754; see also Rogat & O'Fallon, supra note 254, at 1404
(discussing Justice Brandeis's linking of Hand's test in Masses with "imminence of serious
harm" standard). According to Professor Gunther, the Brandenburg principle "combines the
most protective ingredients of the Masses incitement emphasis with the most useful ele-
ments of the clear and present danger heritage." Gunther, supra note 254, at 754; see also
Rogat & O'Fallon, supra note 254, at 1403-04 (noting that Justice Brandeis, in Whitney v.
Cahfornia, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), "anticipates" this develop-
ment and provides guidance without directly construing First Amendment). The majority
in Whitney found no constitutional problem: "We find no repugnancy in the Syndicalism
Act as applied in this case to either the due process or equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment on any of the grounds upon which its validity has been here chal-
lenged." Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372 (Brandeis, J., concurring). Brandeis, in his concurrence,
stated that the defendant had not raised the particular First Amendment question below,
so it could not be reached on appeal from the state court. Id. at 379 (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring).
She claimed below that the statute as applied to her violated the federal Consti-
tution; but she did not claim that it was void because there was no clear and
present danger of serious evil, nor did she request that the existence of these
conditions of a valid measure thus restricting the rights of free speech and
assembly be passed upon by the court or a jury .... Our power of review in
this case is limited not only to the question whether a right guaranteed by the
federal Constitution was denied.., but to the particular claims duly made
below, and denied.
Id. at 379-80 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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incorporation of his "clear and present danger" test failed to
protect Communist Party leaders in Dennis,"o the post-Dennis
Smith Act cases - particularly Yates in 1957 - began to resusci-
tate Hand's substantive Masses norm in a way that resulted in
more protection for political dissenters."°3 In Yates, the Court
used the avoidance canon just as Hand did in Masses,' pro-
tecting political dissidents at a quasi-constitutional level rather
than by direct constitutional interpretation. 5 Although the
Court held that passive Party membership is insufficient for a
Smith Act conviction," it did not fully incorporate Judge
Hand's substantive norm into constitutional law until the
Brandenburg decision in 1969.70
2. Dennis v. United States
In 1951, eleven top leaders of the Communist Party of the
United States were convicted under the Smith Act for conspiracy
to advocate the overthrow of the U.S. government."' In Dennis
v. United States, the Court upheld the convictions under the
conspiracy provisions of the Smith Act, reaching both the First
and Fifth Amendment questions.' Justice Vinson, writing for
the majority, directly addressed the constitutional issues and
held that the challenged sections of the Smith Act did not in-
herently or as applied violate the Constitution because of indefi-
niteness.
The Dennis Court was reviewing another opinion by Judge
Learned Hand, who was now on the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals. In his opinion, Hand had held that the Dennis record
"amply supported" the necessary finding by the jury that defen-
dants "intended to initiate a violent revolution whenever a propi-
Gunther, supra note 254, at 751.
'0' Id. at 752-53.
See Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 537, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (discussing use
of avoidance canon), rVd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
10- Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318-20 (1957), overmded on other grounds by Burks
v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
'0 Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 208-09 (1961).
0 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (holding unconstitutional
those laws which punish mere advocacy and forbid assembly to advocate particular action).
' Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 495, 497 (1951).
309 Id. at 502, 515-17.
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tious occasion appeared.""' ° The fact that Hand, the author of
Masses,o affirmed the Dennis convictions provides an interesting
commentary on how the roles of a lower federal court judge
vary with Supreme Court precedent. In Masses, Hand at the trial
level construed a new statute without express guidance from the
Court. In the decades intervening between Masses and Dennis,
Hand's Masses decision had been explicitly reversed on ap-
peal " ' and the Supreme Court had consistently taken a much
more restrictive approach toward First Amendment protection
for those prosecuted under the World War I Espionage Act."12
Thus constrained by the Court's precedent, Hand affirmed the
convictions at the intermediate appellate level in Dennis."'3
In arguing their case before the Supreme Court, the Dennis
defendants challenged the "advocacy" provision of the Smith Act
as prohibiting even academic discussion of Marxism-Leninism
and as being contrary to the constitutionally protected concepts
of free speech."' The Court rejected this challenge, noting
that courts have a duty to interpret federal legislation in a man-
ner consistent with the Constitution.' Reviewing a series of
cases arising under the Espionage Act in which the convictions
were based on speech, 6 Justice Vinson deduced that the con-
victions could be sustained "only when the speech or publication
created a 'clear and present danger' of attempting or accom-
3, I. at 497.
"' See Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24, 25 (2d Cir. 1917) (reversing Judge Hand's
trial court decision, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917)).
" See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 619 (1919) (rejecting defense's argument
that First Amendment protects printing and distributing circulars which violate Espionage
Act); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 215-16 (1919) (affirming indictment for deliver-
ing speech purporting to obstruct recruiting services in violation of Espionage Act);
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 205-06 (1919) (declaring that First Amendment
does not grant immunity to use of language in violation of Espionage Act); Schenk v. Unit-
ed States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (denying First Amendment protection against indictment
for violating Espionage Act).
"' United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d. 201, 212, 234 (2d. Cir. 1950), aff d 341 U.S. 494.
According to Gerald Gunther, political pressures were not the major factor in this decision.
GuNTHER, supra note 252, at 603. Hand still believed in the Masses formulation, but the Su-
preme Court had taken a different approach to the seditious speech cases. Id. at 604.
" Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951).
315 I&
... Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466
(1920); Abrams, 250 U.S. at 616; Debs, 249 U.S. at 211; Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 204.
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plishing the prohibited crime."" 7 Although this rule was large-
ly defined by a series of Holmes and Brandeis dissents and con-
currences,"8 the Court found "little doubt that subsequent
opinions have inclined toward the Holmes-Brandeis ratio-
nale."
3 19
Reading "clear and present danger" expansively to include
organizing a Communist Party and teaching Marxist-Leninist
doctrine, the Dennis Court said, "To those who would paralyze
our Government in the face of impending threat by encasing it
in a semantic straight jacket we must reply that all concepts are
relative."' 2 Apparently, in the Court's view, in the context of
the political atmosphere of 1951, the danger of world commu-
nism made any associated act a "clear and present danger."
Justice Frankfurter, in his concurrence, focused on balancing
the competing interests of First Amendment speech protection
and the right of a government to preserve itself."' He rea-
soned that the primary decision maker in that balance is Con-
gress, with only narrow and deferential judgments permitted by
the courts."s On the facts in Dennis, Frankfurter found "ample
justification" for Congress's judgment that the conspiracy before
the Court was a "substantial threat to national order and securi-
" Dennis, 341 U.S. at 505.
... See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1919) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stat-
ing that mere fear of serious injury is insufficient to limit speech; must have reasonable
ground for believing imminent danger); Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(indicating that only present danger of immediate evil or intent to bring it about warrants
Congress limiting speech). This test was adopted by the majority in Hendon v. Louy, 301
U.S. 242, 258 (1937) (holding that power to abridge freedom of speech is exception and
court must instead find reasonable apprehension of danger to organized government).
"' Dennis, 341 U.S. at 507 (citations omitted).
I .at 508.
Id. at 519-26 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Justice Frankfurter noted:
Full responsibility for the choice cannot be given to the courts. Courts are not
representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflection of a dem-
ocratic society. Their judgment is best informed, and therefore most depend-
able, within narrow limits. Their essential quality is detachment, founded on
independence. History teaches that the independence of the judiciary isjeopar-
dized when courts become embroiled in the passions of the day and assume
primary responsibility in choosing between competing political, economic and
social pressures.
Id at 525-26 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
[Vol. 30:1
1996] Avoiding Serious Constitutional Doubts
ty." 25 Taking judicial notice of the international political situa-
tion, Frankfurter essentially found reasonable the judgment that
"recruitment of additional members for the Party would create a
substantial danger to national security."324 Further, he distin-
guished forms of speech that are not in the public interest and
thus "rank low" on the "scale of values" - such as the speech at
issue - from forms accorded full constitutional protection.
Dissenting, Justice Douglas characterized the statute as prohib-
iting seditious conspiracy, not organizing people to teach and
actually teaching Marxist-Leninist doctrine. 26 Douglas argued
that since the books themselves were legal, how could teaching
them be illegal?3' Although he noted that world communism
may well constitute relevant danger, the key issue was "the
strength and tactical position of petitioners and their converts in
this country."' 5 Justice Black also dissented, noting that be-
cause the defendants were not charged with either overt acts
against or saying anything designed to overthrow the govern-
ment,s' the prosecutions were "a virulent form of prior cen-
sorship. "33
Id. at 542 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
24 Id. at 547 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For a contrasting view of the strength and
immediacy of the Communist threat, see the dissenting opinions by Justices Black and
Douglas in Dennis, 341 U.S. at 579-84 (BlackJ., dissenting) (questioning how teaching from
books available in any library represents clear and present danger); and their concurrences
in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449-57 (1969) (Black & Douglas, i., concurring) (ar-
guing that clear and present danger standard must not apply during times of peace). The
opinions of Justice Harlan are consistent with this view. See, e.g., Noto v. United States, 367
U.S. 290, 298 (1961) (requiring present advocacy of violence, not mere intent for future
advocacy, to support conviction under membership clause of Smith Act); Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203, 225 (1961) (holding that Smith Act convictions require actual criminal
conduct in addition to associational memberships); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298,
312-13 (1957) (construing Smith Act as requiring advocacy leading to illegal action), over-
ruled on other grounds by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
' Dennis, 341 U.S. at 544-45 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
321 Id. at 582-83 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 583 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas argued that prosecutions of this
sort are tantamount to "constructive treason," in which convictions for treason do not re-
quire overt acts; here, evil thoughts or intent change legal speech into illegal speech. Id.
Id. at 588 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 579 (Black, J., dissenting). Instead, they were charged with "agree[ing] to
assemble and to talk and publish certain ideas at a later date.... [T]hey conspired to
organize the Communist Party and to use speech... in the future to teach and advocate
the forcible overthrow of the government." Id.
3" I&
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In directly affirming the Smith Act's constitutionality, the
Dennis Court "restated clear and present danger in a manner
draining it of most of the immediacy emphasis it had attained
over the years."33 ' This broad interpretation of what constitutes
sufficient cause for repressing political speech had a repressive
effect on radical, and even progressive, political movements. In
fact, the Dennis convictions have been characterized as the "be-
ginning of the end of any meaningful political presence of the
Communists in America." 3 2 In his dissent, Justice Black attrib-
uted the convictions to societal "passions and fears" and ex-
pressed the hope that eventually the Court would "restore the
First Amendment liberties to the high preferred place where
they belong in a free society."3 3
Dennis had both a significant precedential effect during the
subsequent decade and a stunting effect on the development of
First Amendment law.3  In fact, it is unclear whether the
Court has fully restored these rights, because it has yet to direct-
ly contravene the constitutional holdings of Dennis and its proge-
ny.-3 1 Instead, the Court reinterpreted Dennis and avoided the
constitutional question in Yates, affirming Dennis as viable prece-
dent.
3. Yates v. United States
In 1957, six years after Dennis and in a somewhat calmer
political atmosphere, the Court applied the avoidance canon to
reverse the convictions of fourteen lower echelon Communist
leaders, who had been charged with conduct similar to that
challenged in Dennis.ss Writing for the majority, Justice Harlan
"' Gunther, supra note 254, at 751.
-32 Rohr, supra note 255, at 2.
' Dennis, 341 U.S. at 581 (Black, J., dissenting).
Rohr, supra note 255, at 2.
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969) (declaring test granting
speech more protection without overruling Dennis); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298,
310-12, 319, 327 (1957) (construing Smith Act narrowly to exclude certain charges against
petitioners and reverse certain convictions, without reaching constitutional question), over-
ruled on other grounds by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978); see generally, Schwartz,
supra note 299, at 27 (suggesting that convictions of Dennis defendants would not have
occurred using today's clear and present danger standard).
's' Yates, 354 U.S. at 338; see also Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) (invalidating
administrative restrictions on passports for Communists without reaching constitutional
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held that the lower courts had incorrectly interpreted Dennis by
defining "organize" very broadly and by failing to distinguish
between advocacy of "abstract doctrine and advocacy directed at
promoting unlawful action." 7 The Court held that the Smith
Act does not prohibit "advocacy or teaching of forcible over-
throw as an abstract principle, divorced from any effort to insti-
gate action to that end."' s
Harlan reviewed the legislative history of the definition of the
term "organize," and concluded that "revealing guides as to the
intent of Congress" were missing, so it was up to the Court to
determine the meaning.3 9 Applying the rule that criminal stat-
utes be strictly construed,' the Court said "organize" meant
only acts creating a new organization, not subsequent activities
of the organization. s" Thus, the statute of limitations preclud-
ed any further prosecutions for simply "organizing" the Commu-
nist Party."2
Harlan then said that the Court did not have to reach the
constitutional question because its "first duty is to construe this
statute." s 2s At the same time, he identified potential constitu-
tional dangers, saying that, in construing the statute, the Court
"should not assume that Congress chose to disregard a constitu-
tional danger zone so clearly marked."' Nor should Congress
use "the words 'advocate' and 'teach' in .heir ordinary dictio-
nary meanings when they had already been construed as terms
of art carrying a special and limited connotation."' The lower
court's reliance on Dennis was deemed misplaced because the
Dennis jury was "properly instructed that there could be no con-
viction for 'advocacy in the realm of ideas,'"' while the Yates
question).
" Yates, 354 U.S. at 320.
8 Id. at 318.
' I. at 310.
so Kahan, supra note 103, at 347.
'4' Yates, 354 U.S. at 310. This ruling effectively eliminated "organizing" as a basis for
prosecuting Communists, as the three-year statute of limitations had run by 1948.
The Dennis defendants had been convicted for "organizing," but those prosecutions
occurred after the statutory period had expired. Id. at 312.
M~ Id at 319.
544 Id.
545 /d.
-' Id. at 320.
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jury was not told that the Smith Act did not apply to "advocacy
in the sense of preaching abstractly the forcible overthrow of
the Government." '
Because the conspiracy charged was the same in both cases
and the Dennis defendants were even named as co-conspirators
in Yates, this reading of Dennis is incongruous.' The only real
difference was that the perceived imminence of the threat posed
by world communism now seemed more remote. As a result of
the Court's ruling in Yates, five petitioners were released on the
basis that they had not participated in any unlawful activities
and had been convicted solely for being members or officers of
the Communist Party. 9 The cases against the remaining nine
were remanded for consideration of whether certain acts in
evidence "might be considered to be the systematic teaching and
advocacy of illegal action which is condemned by the stat-
ute."' °
B. Ramifications of Avoidance in the Communist Cases
Professor Gerald Gunther praises Harlan's "judicial craftsman-
ship" in Yates."s However, the Court's use of the avoidance
canon in Yates had negative ramifications. First, although the
Court did not invalidate the Smith Act, "constitutional presuppo-
sitions" were read into the statute to "reinvigorate" speech pro-
7 Id at 324.
s" See id. at 344-45 (Clark, J., dissenting) (declaring that because conspiracy charged is
similar to facts in Dennis, it required affirming conviction).
2"9 Id. at 330-31.
ss Id. at 331. On remand the government dismissed the case as to all remaining defen-
dants. See Fujimoto v. United States, 251 F.2d 342, 342 (9th Cir. 1958) (noting that on
remand of Yates government dismissed case against remaining defendants). Justice Black
voted to reverse all the convictions because "the statutory provisions on which these prose-
cutions are based abridge freedom of speech, press and assembly in violation of the First
Amendment." Yates, 354 U.S. at 339 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
He described these political trials as "turgid ... and just plain dull" and their subject mat-
ter as so prejudicial that conviction is "inevitable except in the rarest circumstances." I He
concurred with the Court's interpretation of "organize" and with its determination that the
jury instructions given were erroneous. I& at 340 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). However, he also found the recommended instructions constitutionally doubt-
ful. Justice Black stated: "I believe that the First Amendment forbids Congress to punish
people for talking about public affairs, whether or not such discussion incites to action,
legal or illegal." Id (citations omitted).
"' Gunther, supra note 254, at 753.
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tection and "curtail" the prosecutions."' 2 The Court's constitu-
tional reading in Dennis is still on the books. The Court did not
adopt Judge Hand's Masses First Amendment protections for
political speech until 1969."s s Second, because the rights of fu-
ture political dissenters were protected only at a quasi-constitu-
tional level, the foundation of dissenters' rights was less secure
and the scope of constitutional law was less certain."5 4
If the Masses court or the Yates Court had earlier said that the
First Amendment required the distinction between advocacy of
abstract doctrine and incitement to imminent unlawful action,
would the development of the phantom norm into accepted
constitutional law have been less gradual?' Some might pro-
test that the application of the avoidance canon did not delay
the development of the law, and may have even promoted it.
Under this reasoning, if Hand in Masses had issued a clear con-
stitutional ruling, rather than an exhortation of shared values,
this ruling could have been more easily rejected by the Supreme
Court. But, even without a clear ruling, the Court did reject
Hand's test for decades. Advocates of the use of the avoidance
canon in these cases might further express concerns about the
552 Id.
" See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam) (declaring Ohio
statute which outlawed mere advocacy unconstitutional because it infringed upon
protections of First Amendment).
' Not until Brandenburg did the Court find the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act
unconstitutional, combining the clear and present danger test with the incitement
requirement. Id at 447; see Gunther, supra note 254, at 754 (detailing development of mod-
em First Amendment doctrine from Learned Hand's unpublished correspondence through
Brandenbures clear and present danger test with incitement). Although the Brandenburg
Court labelled the distinction between "mere advocacy and incitement to imminent lawless
action" as "established," Professor Gunther noted that this distinction was "hardly an
'established' [one]." See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449 n.4 (stating that "Statutes affecting
the right of assembly, like those touching on freedom of speech, must observe the
established distinctions between mere advocacy and incitement to imminent lawless
action. .. ."); Gunther, supra note 254, at 754 (declaring that Brandenburg first espoused
modem First Amendment doctrine).
15' Zechariah Chaffee wrote to Hand about Masses in 1920:
I feel more and more that it was a staggering task to solve the problem as you
did at the very outset of the War, with so few precedents and in such pressure
and excitement, and also that if your view had only been followed a living
public opinion might have developed in this country on the ultimate purposes
of the War ....
Gunther, supra note 254, at 767.
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Court overruling Dennis only six years later in Yates. However,
even Justice Brandeis, a frequent advocate of avoidance tech-
niques, recognized that stare decisis has less force in constitu-
tional interpretation.'
In the context of these cases, avoidance resulted in a confus-
ing patchwork of "phantom norms" and First Amendment doc-
trine. A direct constitutional ruling by the Court in Yates would
have at least provided more clarity than does the Dennis-Yates
line. Furthermore, use of the avoidance canon in both Masses
and Yates resulted in painfully slow development of clear stan-
dards to protect the speech of political dissenters.s 7
The Court's approach to precedent in Yates also offers a
glimpse of the disjointed development of substantive standards.
In Yates, the Court said that the lower courts had misconstrued
Dennis. However, the Yates Court's interpretation of the statute
was not mandated by the Dennis decision.' The Yates Court
reinterpreted Dennis and, using a variation of the Masses incite-
ment test,' found that Congress could not have intended to
' See Erie 1.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77 (1938) (noting that if Court overruled
previous interpretation of statute rather than constitutional question, Court would more
likely follow precedent); Kloppenberg, supra note 5, at 333-34 (recognizing that stare
decisis binds Court less in constitutional adjudications because Court instigates
constitutional changes). By a five to four vote, the Court recently overruled its own
constitutional interpretation of only six years earlier regarding Congress's ability to abro-
gate State sovereign immunity. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1118
(1996) (overruling Court's five to four decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1
(1989)). In Seminole, the majority rejected the dissenters' invitation to invoke the avoidance
canon.
We cannot press statutory construction "to the point of disingenuous evasion"
even to avoid a constitutional question. We have already found the clear state-
ment rule satisfied [for abrogation intent], and that finding renders the prefer-
ence for avoiding a constitutional question inapplicable.
Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1124 n.9 (citations omitted). The dissenters argued that the majority
could have avoided the constitutional question at several levels, including by construing the
statute in harmony with Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1146
(Souter, J., dissenting).
'" Gradualism retains the status quo. See Kloppenberg, supra note 5, at 335 (stating that
"the first principle of gradualism [concerns] changing the status quo slowly so as to
preserve a stable content in constitutional law"); Rogat & O'Fallon, supra note 254, at 1366
(discussing Holmes's Social Darwinist ideas about role of courts).
as Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312-27 (1957), ovemded by Burks v. United
States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
' Gunther, supra note 254, at 753.
Avoiding Serious Constitutional Doubts
punish indirect advocacy through the Smith Act.' In so do-
ing, the Yates Court did not use the canon to develop and rein-
force its own clear precedent. Arguably, it used the avoidance
canon to create new constitutional law."
The Court's application of the avoidance canon in Yates seems
motivated by two justifications. First, the Court focused on its
own political vulnerability. The Court was facing congressional
proposals to restrict its authority."2 Second, the Court wanted
Congress to assume more responsibility for balancing speech
rights against other concerns. However, these justifications are
unpersuasive because the Court remains politically viable even
when it counters majoritarian views or becomes involved in what
it considers sensitive social issues. Moreover, the federal courts
have a duty to participate with Congress in choosing between
competing pressures when the Constitution is implicated. By
applying the canon, the Court in Yates left an ambiguous result,
remanding the individual cases and expressing First Amendment
concerns, but not sufficiently protecting other dissenters who
might be prosecuted under the Smith Act or similar statutes.
As a practical matter, Justice Harlan's avoidance technique
may have been necessary because he could obtain a majority for
this narrowing construction, but not for overruling Dennis. 3
Further, Harlan had joined the Court shortly before he
authored Yates.' His approach in Yates yielded some new and
significant protections. First, claiming to interpret Dennis, Justice
Harlan insisted on strict statutory standards of proof emphasiz-
ing the actual speech of the defendants - more consistent with
Yate 354 U.S. at 316-27.
361 Gunther, supra note 254, at 754. Similarly, Gunther notes that the Court in
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 345 U.S. 444 (1969), was "purporting to restate, but in fact creating" a
First Amendment principle. Id.
562 Kreirer, supra note 234, at 23 n.62. According to Professor Kreimer:
That such a confrontation was in the air should not be doubted. In 1958, Con-
gress came within a few votes of passing a statute limiting the power of the
Supreme Court to construe statutes as preempting state regulation, and remov-
ing Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in certain internal security cases.
Id.
See Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1188-98 (noting that appellate courts need to speak
with unanimity and foster consensus even if the result is only measured steps).
' Gunther, supra note 254, at 753.
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the "hard," "objective," words-oriented focus of Masses.' 5 Sec-
ond, the Court's justification for avoidance was to allow
Congress time to express its intention to challenge the Court's
new First Amendment principle. Thus, similar to developments
in the area of federal common law, the Court in a sense
remanded the statute to Congress for a clear statement. Such a
remand arguably reflects deference and respect to a co-equal
interpreter of the Constitution and thus advances the separation
of powers.' In using the canon, however, the Court pretends
to be avoiding constitutional questions when it is in fact
elaborating on constitutional values and "remanding"
legislation. 7 Although the Court is not engaged in direct
constitutional lawsaying in Yates, its phantom norms and
extension of constitutional law's penumbra can be used in the
future to "remand" another statute which violates those norms.
This treatment is a pretense of deference, and in some cases
may actually offend separation of powers more than a direct
constitutional ruling. It is anomalous that the Court relies on
deference and separation of powers to justify invoking the canon
when a common result of employing the canon is to reject
congressional intent.
The Yates Court's use of the canon is particularly troubling
given its failure to overrule Dennis. While many argue that the
Dennis decision is rendered harmless by subsequent changes in
the law, it is still on the books. By failing to address the consti-
tutional issues directly, the Yates Court allowed the decision to
stand. Further, by modifying Dennis without overruling it, the
Yates Court hindered constitutional dialogue. In light of the
Yates decision, Congress would have no need to amend or re-
peal the legislation or to directly test the constitutional bound-
aries on restrictions of free speech. If the Court had consistently
applied the avoidance canon, it would have either addressed or
Id. "In fact, Yats represented doctrinal evolution in a new direction, a direction in
the Masses tradition." Id.
' See Rogat & O'Fallon, supra note 254, at 1399 (stating that "deference to the
legislative judgment... is a subspecies of the most difficult question raised by the Supreme
Court's role in the American governmental system").
"7 See Marshall, supra note 28, at 485-86 (arguing that by "remanding" legislation back
to Congress by finding it unconstitutional, Court actually engages in dialogue and helps
Congress have stronger voice).
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failed to address the constitutional issue in both Dennis and
Yates. Such consistency would have mitigated some of the diffi-
culties presented by the Dennis decision.
The Lobbying Act cases also demonstrate other troublesome
aspects of the canon. They make clear that invocation of the
avoidance canon was a common response of the Court in cases
where Communist and socialist groups were targeted in the
1950s.
C. The Lobbying Act Cases
Between the time the Court issued Dennis in 1951 and Yates
in 1957, it decided two cases construing the Federal Regulation
of Lobbying Act. As these cases demonstrate, the Court avoided
directly confronting Congress about its investigative activities
which impinged upon free speech. By this avoidance, the Court
developed phantom First Amendment norms instead of reaching
First Amendment issues.'
After years of abortive attempts to regulate lobbying,' inter-
spersed with successful regulation of specific categories of lobby-
ists,"7 0 Congress passed the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act
(Lobbying Act) in 1946.17' The Lobbying Act's passage was
considered a success because a comprehensive statute placing
controls on lobbying had finally been enacted.'72 However, the
' In other cases, the Court focused on procedure rather than substance when limiting
disclosure. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 254 (1957) (finding legislative
mandate inadequate for investigative activities); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 43
(1953) (holding that challenged disclosure exceeded committee authority); Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 142-43 (1951) (Black, J., concurring)
(declaring that attempts to label "Communist front organizations" violated due process).
As early as 1907, Congress began introducing multiple bills proposing regulatory
schemes; all were rejected or lapsed after one term. See Thomas, supra note 268, at 152
(discussing Act that Congress passed to regulate lobbying); Orval Hansen, Note, The Federal
Lobbying Act: A Reconsideration, 21 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 585, 589 (1953) (discussing history of
Lobbying Acts).
..0 See, e.g., Public Utility Holding Co. Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 838 (1935) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 79(1)(i) (1996)) (requiring holding company lobbyists to file
disclosures with Securities and Exchange Commission); Merchant Marine Act, ch. 858, 49
Star. 1985, 2014 (1936) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 1225 (1940)) (requiring
lobbyists for shipbuilding and ship-operating companies to file disclosure with Maritime
Commission); Thomas, supra note 268, at 153-55 (mentioning requirements for lobbyists in
various industries).
2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70 (repealed 1995).
See Belle Zeller, The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 42 AM. POL. So. REv. 239, 245
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statute itself was notably ambiguous, and it engendered substan-
tial criticism. Primarily, this criticism focused on First Amend-
ment issues raised by its vague definitions of "lobbying" and
"principal purpose" and its extensive accounting require-
ments.373 Although it does not use the term "lobbyist," the Act
applies to any person who "directly or indirectly, solicits, collects,
or receives money or any other thing of value to be used princi-
pally to . . . influence," or "the principal purpose of which is to
aid in the accomplishment of," the passage or defeat of legisla-
tion. 74 This definition potentially reaches broadly into grass-
roots and other activities not normally considered "lobbying."
In United States v. Rumely, 75 the Court used the broad ap-
proach to the canon to find that a congressional resolution
raised serious doubts in light of First Amendment protection for
political speech. 7 In so doing, the Court construed the Lobby-
ing Act extremely narrowly, despite persuasive evidence that
Congress intended the Act to regulate lobbying activities more
broadly. 7  Subsequently, in United States v. Harriss,378  the
Court again invoked the broad approach to the canon to narrow
the Act and constrain congressional activity.' In both cases,
rather than explicating fully its First Amendment concerns, the
Court avoided a political confrontation with Congress through
phantom norms and aggressive statutory interpretation.
1. United States v. Rumely
The House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities ("Com-
mittee") was established in response to wide criticism of the Act,
to determine how well it was working and to make recommenda-
tions for its improvement.' In the course of its investigation,
(1948) (describing how Lobbying Act was applied); Note, Improving the Legislative Process:
Federal Regulation of Lobbying, 56 YALE LJ. 304, 316-18 (1947) (discussing legislative history
and structure of Lobbying Act).
373 Note, The Federal Lobbying Act of 1946, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 98, 109 n.66 (1946).
37- 2 U.S.C. § 266 (1988) (repealed 1995) (emphasis added).
345 U.S. 41 (1953).
376 Id. at 42-48.
177 Id. at 46.
17' 347 U.S. 612 (1954)
17 Id. at 625-26.
1o Rumely, 345 U.S. at 45.
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the Committee called Edward A. Rumely, Secretary of the Com-
mittee for Constitutional Government (CCG). Rumely had
met the organizational registration requirements under the Act,
but had failed to register under section 304, which required that
lobbying organizations disclose detailed information about any
person contributing more than $500 for the purpose of lobby-
ing." The CCG did not accept payments greater than $490
unless the contributors specified that they be used for distribu-
tion of one or more of CCG's pamphlets. The CCG considered
contributions that were to be used only for the distribution of
pamphlets "sales" and did not report them under the Act."ss
The books were then sent to the contributors or to specified
categories of recipients, such as libraries or "farm leaders."ss4
At the time of this investigation, CCG was a socialist organiza-
tion whose basic function was the "distribution of printed mate-
rial to influence legislation indirectly. " 's When Rumely refused
to disclose to the Committee the names of those who made
bulk purchases of CCG books, he was convicted for contempt of
Congress. 6 The government argued that CCG was trying to
influence legislation indirectly by sending these books to people
throughout the U.S. and directly by sending them to members
of Congress.s 7 Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, rather
delicately addressed the political climate in his discussion of "the
penetrating and pervasive scope of the investigative power of
Congress."' No other Justice even mentioned the ongoing
' Id. at 42.
Id. at 50 (Douglas, J., concurring). Those regulated must register with the Clerk of
the House of Representatives and Secretary of the Senate, and make detailed disclosures
about their activities and source of financing, including identification of contributors who
give the lobbyist or her organization $500 or more. 2 U.S.C. § 264(a) (1988) (repealed
1995).
Rumely, 345 U.S. at 50 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 50-51 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas points out that the Committee
for Constitutional Government did report the name of an individual who paid for a distri-
bution that included direct mailings to members of Congress. Id. at 51 n.3 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
Id. at 50 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 42.
31 Id. at 45-46.
'. at 43. For example, Justice Frankfurter obliquely described the CCG books as
being "of a particular political tendentiousness." Id. at 42. See aLso Judith Resnik, Rereading
-The Federal Courts" Revising the Domain of Federal Courts Junspudene at the End of the Twenti-
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congressional activities such as those of the House Un-American
Activities Committee or the activities of Senator Joseph McCar-
thy.
The Court overturned the contempt citation against Rumely
for refusal to answer questions before the Committee.' How-
ever, rather than holding the Committee's authorizing resolution
unconstitutional for lack of standards or for infringing First
Amendment rights, the Court invoked the avoidance canon,
finding that the congressional resolution simply did not autho-
rize the Committee's investigation into the area in question.'
The Court thereby extended its duty to interpret federal statutes
"to reach a conclusion which will avoid serious doubt of their
constitutionality""1 to congressional resolutions.' g However, it
never elaborated on why "this duty of not needlessly projecting
delicate issues for judicial pronouncement" was more applicable
to resolutions than to formal legislation." 3 Perhaps the Justices
presumed that formal legislation is more carefully thought out
and systematic, and thus rewriting a regulation through the
canon is less offensive than rewriting a statute because the regu-
lation is one step removed from the authorizing statute. Such
reasoning might be extended today to administrative agency
regulations that implement a statute, but the Court failed to do
this in Rust.394
Despite claims that the Court was avoiding constitutional ques-
tions in Rumely, Justice Frankfurter addressed First Amendment
eth Centuiy, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1021, 1038-41 (1994) (noting how Court's opinions - particu-
larly Railtrad Comm'n v. Pulman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), written byJustice Frankfurter -
fail to supply readers with sufficient social and political context).
Rumely, 345 U.S. at 42, 48 (affirming court of appeals' reversal of district court's
decision, 197 F.2d 166 (D.C. App. 1952)).
Rumely, 345 U.S. at 47-48.
Id at 45 (quoting Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 346
(1928)). Frankfurter, quoting previous decisions, elaborates on the canon and states that
courts must construe a statute "so as to avoid doubts as to its validity," and to first find
'whether a construction ... is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be
avoided." Id (citations omitted).
Id at 45 (citing Federal Trade Comm'n v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306
(1924)).
'9' Id. at 45-46.
See supra notes 193-227 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional construc-
tion of Public Health Services Act Title X regulation).
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concerns posed by the resolution.'9 5 He cited Holmes in saying
that while the investigative function is not to be minimized, all
apparent absolutes "in fact are limited by the neighborhood of
principles of policy... which become strong enough to hold
their own when a certain point is reached."' 8 Specifically, the
government's broad interpretation of the investigative scope set
out in the resolution, "deriving from it the power to inquire
into all efforts of private individuals to influence public opinion
through books and periodicals, however remote the radiations of
influence which they may exert upon the ultimate legislative
process" raised First Amendment concerns."97  Frankfurter
warned that if those concerns were adjudicated directly, it could
have far-reaching effects on the congressional power of investiga-
tion; when the Court places constitutional limits on Congress's
investigative power, it should only do so "after Congress has
demonstrated its full awareness of what is at stake by unequivo-
cally authorizing an inquiry of dubious limits." "' Further, he
indirectly expressed concern about avoiding political pressures
on the Court which would likely increase if the Court directly
condemned the Committee's activities.'
Rumey, 345 U.S. at 46.
Id. at 43-44 (citing Justice Holmes in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarte, 209 U.S.:
349, 355 (1908)).
-7 Rumey, 345 U.S. at 46. See also id. at 43 (recognizing reach of congressional investiga-
tive powers and questioning rights which that reach implicates).
Id. at 46.
Grave constitutional questions are matters properly to be decided by this Court
but only when they inescapably come before us for adjudication. Until then it
is our duty to abstain from marking the boundaries of congressional power or
delimiting the protection guaranteed by the First Amendment. Only by such
self-restraint will we avoid the mischief which has followed occasional depar-
tures from the principles we profess.
Id. at 48.
' Frankfurter used Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. (13 Otto) 168, 199-202 (1881), to
depict what can happen when the Court fails to avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudica-
tion: the Court was subject to criticism and subsequent judicial inroads. See Rumely, 345 U.S.
at 46 (citing Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 298 (1929), which held that pertinence
of question during congressional investigation is question of law, and McGrain v. Daugherty,
273 U.S. 135, 170-71 (1927), which presumed legislative purpose when subject matter un-
der investigation is within Congress's jurisdiction); see also Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 196
(holding that congressional power of investigation does not extend to private affairs or
matters that cannot be legislated upon). The Rumely Court cites James M. Landis, Constitu-
tional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 HARv. L. REv. 153, 217 (1927),
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Thus, instead of looking to the definition of the restricted
acts in the resolution, Frankfurter adopted the reasoning of the
lower court. He avoided reaching the constitutionality of the
resolution by applying the plain meaning of "lobbying in its
commonly accepted sense" - "representations made directly to
the Congress, its members, or its committees."' This defini-
tion did not include attempts "to saturate the thinking of the
community.""' He couched the reasons for so construing the
phrase in negatives, saying, "it does no violence to the phrase
'lobbying activities' to give it a more restricted scope . . . [it] is
not barred by intellectual honesty." ' While acknowledging
that its narrow definition of lobbying was "strained," Frankfurter
pointed out that "words have been strained more than they
need to be strained here in order to avoid that doubt"" in
view of the avoidance canon's "wisdom and duty."' Here,
Frankfurter urged broad use of the avoidance canon, and, by
using prohibitions instead of positive directives, he set extremely
wide or "outer" limits that allow the Court a great deal of lati-
tude. 5
Essentially, the Court avoided the constitutional question in
Rumely by narrowly construing the enabling resolution to hold
that the committee never had the authority to require Rumely
as an example of the "weighty criticism" of Kilbourn. Rumely, 345 U.S. at 46. Professor
Landis states that the Court "sharply limited... the breadth and extent of legislative func-
tions" when in fact "the inquiry, placed in its proper background, should have been regard-
ed as a normal and customary part of the legislative process." Landis, supra, at 214, 217. See
genera/ly FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN THE FEDERALJUDICIAL SYSTEM 307-18 (1927) (discussing Court's role in interpret-
ing Constitution).
Rumely, 345 U.S. at 47 (emphasis added) (quoting Rumely v. United States, 197 F.2d
166, 175 (D.C. App. 1952)).
i" Id. (citing Lobbying Direct and Indirect, 1950: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. of
LobbyingActivities, 81st Cong., 111 (1950)).
4MI
Id. (citing Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring)).
Id. (citing United States v. Congress of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 120-22 (1948)).
Id. at 48. Perhaps this varies by the political climate and composition of the Court.
Compare, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995) (construing statute liter-
ally and holding it unconstitutional) with United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-51 (1971)
(holding that "[t]he Court interpreted the possession component.., to require an addi-
tional nexus to interstate commerce. ...." and finding statute constitutional).
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to disclose the disputed information. °6 However, Justice Doug-
las, in his concurrence, casts doubt on the validity of this rea-
soning. He argued that the Committee's action was well within
the scope of the broad resolution." 7 Although he deemed that
delegation of power unconstitutional, he viewed the majority's
narrow construction of the resolution as a contradiction of its
obvious terms."°  Douglas argued that the legislative history re-
affirmed this broad delegation of power.' Since the House
clearly intended a very broad meaning of "lobbying," the Com-
mittee did not exceed its authority and the Court must reach
the constitutional question.
Douglas did address the constitutional issues. In his view,
the First Amendment protects criticism of the government and
unorthodox views as well as uncontroversial expression.4"' If
the government is permitted to require publishers to disclose
who buys their books, it "is indeed the beginning of surveillance
of the press."4" That is, sanctioning this type of inquiry would
have the practical effect of censorship, because people would
become fearful of reading unpopular or unorthodox materials,
40' Rumely, 345 U.S. at 45-48.
SId. at 53-56 (Douglas,J., concurring).
Id. at 55-56 (Douglas, J., concurring). Resolution 298 states that anyone called by the
committee who "refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry"
will be guilty of a misdemeanor. Id. at 49 n.1.
Its history makes plain that it was intended to probe the sources of support of
lobbyists registered under the [Act] .... The purpose of the Resolution was to
investigate the operations of that Act. Not a word in the Resolution, not a word
in the debate preceding its adoption suggests that the inquiry was to be delim-
ited, restricted, or confined to particular methods of collecting money to influ-
ence legislation directly or indirectly.
Id. at 53-54 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 55 (Douglas, J., concurring). When Rumely's contempt citation was referred
back to the House for ratification, a fierce debate ensued, during which Congressman
Charles Halleck argued that this kind of inquiry was not within the scope of the Resolution
and that if it were it would be unconstitutional. Id. (citing 96 CONG. REc. 13887-88 (1950)).
The Committee interpreted its mandate consistent with this broad view, specifically noting
that "pamphleteering" was a lobbying activity, using CCG as an example. Id. at 54 (Douglas,
J., concurring) (citing H.R. REP. No. 3239, 81st Cong., 1, 3). The contempt resolution
passed. IM at 55 (Douglas, J., concurring). In Justice Douglas's view, this vote reaffirmed
the meaning of the initial resolution, which raised serious constitutional issues. Id.
"' Id. at 57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
411 Id.
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those which "the powers-that-be dislike."412 Since the govern-
ment could not directly prohibit such expression, and this kind
of disclosure would do so indirectly, Congress may not do it by
investigation."'
Rumely can be seen as a "sea change" in that for the first time
the Court recognized that First Amendment values extended to
lobbying activities. In response, the Court signalled a limitation
on the growing reach of congressional investigations and intru-
sion into First Amendment rights.4" 4 Previously, the attitude to-
ward lobbying and lobbyists had been condescending, if not
contemptuous. 5  By voicing its constitutional concerns in
Rumely, the Court was able to limit the scope of the
Committee's investigation. Instead of addressing these concerns
directly, the Court applied the avoidance canon at the expense
of creating a phantom norm or extending the penumbra of the
First Amendment. The Court artificially withheld an explicit
affirmation of constitutional principles by its creative interpreta-
tion of congressional intent."1 This may have been designed to
save the Court from a destructive confrontation during the Mc-
Carthy era while also affording Congress one last opportunity to
do the right thing. However, as the Court's next case consider-
ing the Act made clear, the Court's construction of the Act had
little to do with congressional intent.
412 1&.
411 Id. at 58 (Douglas, J., concurring). "Through the harassment of hearings, investiga-
tions, reports, and subpoenas government will hold a club over speech and over the press."
Id.
414 Id. at 44-48; see also Thomas, supra note 268, at 160, 161 n.87 (identifying change
from previous political and judicial attitudes about lobbying and noting that when Court
held that First Amendment applied to lobbying, it overruled Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 441 (1874)).
4,5 For example, Senator (laterJustice) Black condemned lobbyists, stating:
Contrary to tradition, against the public morals, and hostile to good govern-
ment, the lobby has reached such a position of power that it threatens govern-
ment itself. Its size, its power, its capacity for evil; its greed, trickery, deception
and fraud condemn it to the death it deserves.
L. HARMON ZIEGLER & G. WAYNE PEAK, INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 35 (2d ed.
1972).
4'6 Rumely, 345 U.S. at 44-45. The concurrence in Rumely provides substantial support
for the fact that Congress explicitly intended that the broader meaning of "lobbying" apply,
and that its members were aware of the potential constitutional issues involved. Id. at 54
(Douglas, J., concurring).
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2. United States v. Harriss
One year after Rumely, the Court in United States v. Harriss
upheld the Lobbying Act against First and Fourth Amendment
challenges."7 In order to do so, the Court judicially rewrote
the Act, radically narrowing its application and scope under the
rubric of the avoidance canon."8 This judicial reconstruction
continued to define the Act until 1996.' The activities at issue
in Harriss involved agricultural prices rather than political agita-
tion, and reporting of expenditures and defendants' activities
rather than disclosure of contributors' names. ° While volatile
political issues are not as evident in Harriss, the dispute over the
Act in Rumely and the direction taken by the Court in that case
must not have been far from the thoughts of the Justices.
Defendants Ralph W. Moore and Robert M. Harriss were
prosecuted for undisclosed expenditures, and Moore and Tom
Linder for not registering as lobbyists for pay.4 ' Each defen-
dant argued that the Act was unconstitutionally vague and violat-
ed First Amendment guarantees of free speech, free press, and
the right to petition the government. 42 2 The Court noted that
the offenses were within the general class of offenses plainly
included in the Act, "[a] nd if this general class of offenses can
be made constitutionally definite by a reasonable construction of
the statute, this Court is under a duty to give the statute that
construction." 12-
, United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 624-25 (1954).
414 Id at 617-24 (citing cases to support Court's duty to construe statute so as to avoid
danger of unconstitionality; including United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366,
407-08 (1909), and United States v. Congress of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 120-21 (1948)).
Lobbying Disclosure Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601-12 (1996).
"2 Harriss, 347 U.S. at 613-17.
421 Id at 615-17.
4 Id. at 617. Specifically, defendants alleged that:
(1) §§ 305, 307, 308 are too vague and indefinite to meet the requirements of
due process; [and]
(2) that §§ 305 and 308 violate the First Amendment guarantees of freedom
of speech, freedom of press, and the right to petition the Government; [and]
(3) that the penalty provision of § 310(b) violates the right of the people
under the First Amendment to petition the Government.
I Id at 618 (citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 100, 105 (1945), which upheld
definiteness of Civil Rights Act).
1996]
University of California, Davis
The Court relied upon Rumely for the meaning of the
phrase "to influence directly or indirectly the passage of legisla-
tion" as used in the Act.424 Thus, the Act was construed to
cover only "lobbying in its commonly accepted sense" of direct
communication with members of Congress on pending or pro-
posed federal legislation. 425  The Court asserted that while
avoiding constitutional issues by statutory construction, it must
also avoid constructions that "seriously impair the effectiveness
of the Act" in accomplishing its purpose. 6 The Court project-
ed that at minimum Congress sought disclosure of direct lobby-
ing efforts, and that "[i]t is likewise clear that Congress would
have intended the Act to operate on this narrower basis, even if
a broader application to organizations seeking to propagandize
the general public were not permissible." 427 But it is difficult to
see how such a radically narrow construction of the Act does
not seriously impair its effectiveness.428
The Court held that the "principal purpose" requirement of
the Act is to exclude from its scope contributions and persons
who have only an incidental purpose of influencing legisla-
tion.4  Rejecting the broader construction urged by the gov-
ernment, the Court limited coverage under the Act to those per-
sons who solicit, collect or receive contributions, and then only if
the "principal purpose" of such person or of such contribution
is to influence legislation. 4s' The Court would not accept the
government's construction without a clear statement from Con-
gress about its intention - perhaps through revision of the
existing Lobbying Act. 4-'
While sympathetic to the desire of the majority to save the
statute, Justice Douglas dissented because "the formula adopted
424 Id. at 61.7, 620.
425 See id. at 620 (citing Rumely, 345 U.S. at 47, which also construed statutory language
narrowly).
426 Id. at 623.
427 Id. at 620-21.
4" See id. at 624-25 (indicating that Lobbying Act, as narrowly construed by Court,
meets constitutional definiteness requirements and does not violate First Amendment).
121 Id. at 622.
" Id. at 619. This interpretation thus excludes anyone who only spends money to influ-
ence legislation. See also id. at 619-20 (expressing concerns that Act interferes with exercise
of constitutional rights).
"I Id. at 620.
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to save this Act is too dangerous for use."4"2 Additionally,
Douglas reasoned that because the statute imposed criminal
penalties, it must be sufficiently narrow and precise so as to give
fair warning."3 The majority's construction may meet that re-
quirement, he noted, but "[t]he difficulty is that the Act has to
be rewritten and words actually added and subtracted to pro-
duce that result."4"
Douglas was also concerned that the ambiguities remaining
even after the Court "rewrote" the statute would serve to chill
freedom of expression."' He emphasized that statutes touching
on First Amendment issues must be "narrowly drawn to prevent
the supposed evil, " "4s and that, while at times a court may
place a judicial gloss on statutes to save them from vagueness,
this was not an appropriate case for doing so because the statute
was so broad that it failed to provide fair notice."'
Justice Jackson likewise dissented in Harriss because the Court
so radically rewrote the Act.4s Jackson detailed how the Court
deleted, changed, and expanded different elements of the Act,
eliminating protection against the "more serious evil[s]" found
132 Id. at 628 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 629 (Douglas. J., dissenting). This theme was also part of the Court's rationale
in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994). See Kahan, supra note 103, at
351 (discussing how lenity constrains judicial interpretation of ambiguous criminal stat-
utes); supra notes 94-144 and accompanying text (discussing X-Cittemnt Video).
Harriss, 347 U.S. at 629 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 633 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Probably in response to the dissenting opinion,
Chief Justice Warren briefly addressed the potential chilling of First Amendment rights,
saying that the risk of situations "in which such persons choose to remain silent because of
fear of possible prosecution for failure to comply with the Act... is too remote to require
striking down a statute which on its face is otherwise plainly within the area of congressio-
nal power and is designed to safeguard a vital national interest." Id. at 626.
" Id. at 632 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
307 (1940)).
437 Id.
Id. at 633 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Jackson states:
The clearest feature of this case is that it begins with an Act so mischievously
vague that the Government charged with its enforcement does not understand
it, for some of its important assumptions are rejected by the Court's interpreta-
tion. The clearest feature of the Court's decision is that it leaves the country
under an Act which is not much like any Act passed by Congress .... I recall
few cases in which the Court has gone so far in rewriting an Act.
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in lobbyists who spend their own money; 39 he noted that six
of the counts in this case involved that issue, as opposed to one
count that rested on failure to report receipts.' In contrast to
the rule of lenity,"' Jackson believed that true criminal statutes
should be interpreted liberally because any moral wrongness
should be clear to perpetrators."' But here, Jackson continued,
First Amendment rights are very likely impaired and there is no
"moral wrongness" to provide warning; instead, lobbying involves
a "novel offense" with no established bounds."' Therefore, in-
stead of contorting to make the Act constitutional, Jackson sug-
gested that the Court "should point out the defects and limita-
tions which condemn this Act so clearly that the Court cannot
sustain it as written, and leave its rewriting to Congress."'
D. Ramifications of Avoidance in the Lobbying Act Cases
Justice Frankfurter's broad formulation of the avoidance can-
on in Rumely allows a court much more than the power to cor-
rect a "scrivener's error" in statutory language. It allows a court
to construe a statute so as to conform to its conception of the
Constitution, subject only to a court's "intellectual honesty." As
Rumely and Harriss demonstrate, this allows courts to alter drasti-
cally the legislation to protect phantom constitutional norms
without ever stating that the Constitution demands the statute's
rewriting. These decisions may protect some litigants, but they
do so without a hard-fought and decisive battle to achieve con-
sensus about a constitutional challenge. Instead, constitutional
law is developed through phantom norms, leaving constitutional
459 Id.
0 Id. at 633-34 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
"' See Kahan, supra note 103, at 346 (discussing failure of lenity in federal criminal
law).
"4' Harriss, 347 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
,. Id.; see, e.g., Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952) (holding
that Interstate Commerce Commission regulation is not void for vagueness); United States
v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947) (stating that language of Communications Act is suffi-
ciently definite); cf Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1951) (stating that test for
determining validity of statute is whether statute conveys sufficiently definite warning re-
garding conduct according to standard practices); see generailyJames C. Quarles, Some Statu-
tosy Construction Problems and Approaches in Criminal Law, 3 VAND. L. REV. 531, 539-43 (1950)
(stating that sufficient definiteness is more crucial in criminal area than other areas).
"' Harriss, 347 U.S. at 636 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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law less clear and less uniform. Depending on how assertively
courts employ a broad formulation of the canon like
Frankfurter's in Rumely, the courts can be extremely creative in
extending or redefining constitutional norms through the canon.
While courts pretend to be avoiding constitutional questions and
issuing confined decisions when they invoke the avoidance can-
on, they are in fact making constitutional law."5
Moreover, a statute narrowed by use of the canon will lose
some of its effectiveness, as the dissenters charged in both X-
Citement Video"' and Harviss."7  Legislative options will be
foreclosed by phantom norms. For example, the Lobbying Act
was generally perceived as ineffective after Harriss. Serious
legislative attempts to amend the Court's narrow construction of
the Act were not undertaken until the 1970s, and then without
success;' the Act was not replaced until 1996, when a new act
with stronger and broader disclosure requirements was enact-
ed. 9 As noted by Judge Posner in his criticism of the avoid-
ance canon, "Congress's practical ability to overrule a judicial
decision misconstruing one of its statutes, given all the other
matters pressing for its attention, is less today than ever before,
and probably was never very great."4" Thus, avoiding constitu-
tional questions through the canon does not necessarily promote
deference to legislatures.
.. See Marshall, supra note 28, at 488 (discussing fiction Court adopts by analyzing
statutes as if Congress intended to avoid constitutional questions); Posner, supra note 53, at
816 (weighing benefits and harms of statutory interpretation canons).
"I United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464, 473 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
147 Harriss, 347 U.S. at 633 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
"' Mary Kathryn Vanderbeck, Note, First Amendment Constraints of the Federal Regulation of
Lobbying Ac 57 TEx. L. REV. 1219, 1224-25 (1979).
"9 Lobbying Disclosure Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601-12 (1996). See also John F. Harris, Law
Aspiring to Shed Light on Lobbyists Leaves Some Gray Areas, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1995, at A4
(discussing implications of new Lobbying Act).
The law... vastly expands the number of people who must register as lobbyists
and requires them to say how much they are being paid and what specific is-
sues they are working. And unlike the old lobbying law passed in 1946, which
applied only to Congress, the new law covers lobbying contacts with senior
executive branch officials.
450 Posner, supra note 53, at 816.
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Arguably, the Court furthered speech protection by voicing
constitutional concerns in the Lobbying Act cases in the mid-
1950s. Those 'decisions may have even informed the Court's
reference to similar norms in Yates in 1957 and indirectly stalled
further prosecutions of American Communists. But in the Lob-
bying Act cases, the Court's reliance on fears for its own politi-
cal viability or on the pretense of deference to Congress to
support its avoidance of constitutional questions is unsettling
and inadequate. The Lobbying Act remained as written, subject
to a substantial judicial reinterpretation, and was unchanged
until 1996; the Smith Act exists exactly as reenacted in 1948,
although Brandenburg set out a First Amendment principle for
evaluating the limits on speech by political dissidents. 5'
CONCLUSION
This Article argues that courts and other constitutional actors
should engage in more direct discussion of the merits of consti-
tutional issues. Courts, particularly the Supreme Court, can best
accomplish this by addressing the merits of constitutional chal-
lenges rather than using the avoidance canon to speculate about
potential constitutional difficulties in statutes. Despite the pre-
tense of avoidance, courts using the canon are indirectly making
constitutional law. This approach is a potentially more confusing
and disjointed manner of developing constitutional principles
than having courts expressly state constitutional principles and
revise them over time. The canon is based upon problematic
assumptions about the role of courts and the legislative process.
Further, in using the canon, courts often do not defer to the
majoritarian branches or advance dialogic interaction among
courts and legislatures. Thus, courts should be wary of using the
avoidance canon.
If courts prefer to retain the canon, one solution to improve
its functioning is to apply a single approach to the canon. As
shown above, the two major versions of the canon are not ap-
"' Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), dealt with the Ohio Syndicalism Act and
overruled Whitney v. Cah/fornia, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); the Brandenburg standard would apply
to any prosecutions under the Smith Act today. A similar state statute was at issue when the
Court framed the doctrine of "Younger abstention" in Youngerv. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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plied consistently; instead, political choices about reaching the
merits of particular issues sometimes drive the selection of the
broad or narrow version. Therefore, courts, particularly the
Supreme Court, should employ the narrow version in most in-
stances. The narrow version is more limited and constrained,
and fosters less avoidance than the broad, "serious doubts" ver-
sion.
Based on the First Amendment cases discussed, this Article
offers factors for determining whether use of the narrow version
is appropriate. First, in employing the canon, a court must re-
flect on their role vis-a-vis other constitutional actors in statutory
interpretation. Is a court's role (1) to determine as accurately as
possible legislative intent; or (2) is it to articulate, develop, and
promote public values by filling statutory gaps with its own con-
ception of constitutional values? Judges use the canon in adher-
ing to both views of valid court functions. But when a court
decides to use any one of the varying formulations of the canon,
this decision will affect which of these two roles the court is
filling. The scrivener's error limitation and the broader reason-
ableness limitation on the canon reflect a concern for judicial
adherence to legislative intent. In contrast, Justice Frankfurter's
flexible formulation of the canon in Rumely allows courts to stray
farther from legislative intent. If courts discuss their appropriate
roles in statutory interpretation, they will better inform us when
they are truly arguing over ambiguous constitutional intent and
when they are using the canon to develop their own constitu-
tional values.
A second essential factor in considering the canon's appropri-
ateness involves thinking about how the canon and constitution-
al precedent interact. While cases - particularly Supreme Court
cases - always have some significance beyond the immediate
parties and dispute, in applying the avoidance canon, courts
sometimes rely broadly on indirect precedent in new circum-
stances. Thus, in terms of precedent, the approach used in X-
Citement Video (in which the Court relies on its own fairly clear,
prior constitutional rulings) seems more defensible than the
Yates approach, in which the Court recognizes a new constitu-
tional danger that is not remotely clear from its existing prece-
dent. Arguably, deployment of the canon in Yates may have
been the only way to secure the majority of votes required to
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protect the Communist party members, but the canon is a costly
method of adjudicating constitutional claims.
Third, courts should consider whether a "quasi-constitutional"
ruling sufficiently protects individual rights or other substantive
constitutional concerns. Some might argue that the fundamental
importance of free speech in our democracy makes this factor
more relevant here than in other contexts. For example, in the
Communist cases and the Lobbying Act cases, the Court failed
to fulfill its role in developing constitutional law; namely to
protect unpopular political dissenters from majoritarian legisla-
tive and executive judgments during a period of crisis. Courts
should address this substantive and procedural interplay whenev-
er they consider using the canon. Application of the canon -
often justified as protecting the courts from political controver-
sies - cannot be divorced from its political and social effects.
Fourth, in addition to the substantive effects of a choice to
use or reject the canon, courts should consider the effects on
the political controversy surrounding a particular constitutional
challenge. The Court's selection (and rejection) of the narrow
version of the canon in Rust arguably supported an end-run by
the executive branch around Congress and shifted the balance
of power, after Congress had repeatedly rejected a statutory
amendment. Use of the more common "serious doubts" formula-
tion of the canon to remand the issue to Congress might have
resulted in a different political outcome than did the Court's
decision on the merits. Similarly, when courts consider challeng-
es to state statutes, as the Supreme Court did in Brockett, they
should evaluate the strength of the federal and state interests,
the novelty of the claim, and the activity of the state legislature
and courts on the constitutional issue. This factor aims at ad-
dressing the separation of powers and federalism justifications
for avoidance. Additionally, both the third and the fourth fac-
tors aim at assessing the canon's effect on long-term constitu-
tional dialogue and development of constitutional law.
Finally, it is imperative to consider which court is undertaking
the task of statutory interpretation. This Article argues that the
Supreme Court should address the merits of constitutional chal-
lenges more frequently, even when a lower court could defend
its use of the canon. Separation of powers concerns vary with
the court that is employing the canon. Because the Supreme
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Court has the ultimate role in developing constitutional law and
ensuring uniformity in federal law, -the lower courts might ap-
propriately use the avoidance canon to take measured steps -
interpreting the Supreme Court's precedent in new factual situa-
tions or where the statute is ambiguous. Thus, in Masses, when
litigants challenged a new federal statute, Judge Hand's use of
the canon to voice free speech concerns was more justified than
the Supreme Court's use of it 40 years later in Yates.
Even if jurists find these factors unacceptable, they can use
the catalogue of approaches to the avoidance canon identified
here to recognize and explain their process of constitutional
interpretation more candidly. For example, are they merely
enforcing clear Supreme Court precedent when construing a
statute so as to avoid serious doubt? Or are they identifying new
constitutional concerns? Have they used the canon to avoid
political confrontation with Congress (as in the Lobbying Act
and Communist cases) or are they ignoring interbranch political
struggles in considering the canon (as in Rust)? Such clarifica-
tion would provide better signals to other constitutional inter-
preters about their avenues for response in advancing a dialogue
about particular constitutional issues and counter the perception
that only the judiciary can interpret the Constitution.
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